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INTRODUCTION
At the heart of contemporary property theory stands an
intriguing puzzle. Unlike the relatively unconstrained freedom that
contract law provides for private ordering, property law recognizes
only a limited and standard list of mandatory forms.1  This
standardization-known as the numerus clausus from the civil law
concept that the "number is closed" 2-poses a basic conundrum: what
can explain a persistent feature of the law that seems, at first glance,
1. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 23 (2000) ("[Tjhe numerus clausus
exerts a powerful hold on the system of property rights... [and] from the perspective of the
practicing lawyer, the entire system presents the picture of a fixed menu of options from which
deviations will not be permitted."). As discussed below, see infra Part I.A.1, the numerus clausus
principle is embodied in contemporary property law in the palette of estates in land, servitudes,
security interests in property, and in intellectual property, as well as in emerging forms of
property.
2. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 4. The numerus clausus principle has long been an
explicit aspect of civil law systems. See, e.g., J. Michael Milo, Property and Real Rights, in ELGAR
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 587, 593-600 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006) (discussing the
numerus clausus principle in civil law); see also Roderick R.M. Paisley, Real Rights: Practical
Problems and Dogmatic Rigidity, 9 EDINBURGH L. REV. 267, 267 (2004) (discussing the numerus
clausus principle in Scottish law, a mixed common law and civil law jurisdiction).
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so clearly to restrict the autonomy and efficiency gains conventionally
associated with private property?
This puzzle has garnered significant scholarly attention in
recent years.3 Some scholars have argued that standardization,
although paternalistic, in fact enhances efficiency. These accounts
emphasize the potential of standardization to facilitate alienation,
scale property interests appropriately for productive use, and reduce
information-cost externalities. 4 Another group of scholars has argued
that the numerus clausus embodies inherent categories of meaning.
Under these perspectives, the numerus clausus reflects the normative
coherence of existing social patterns, the objective well-being of
interest holders, or underlying democratic values.
5
Although these attempts to explain standardization in property
law offer significant insights, they suffer from two interlocking
limitations. Efficiency perspectives focus on the meta-structure of
standardization, largely ignoring what the rich and interesting
content of the individual forms reveals about the phenomenon.
Conversely, approaches to standardization that focus on content have
much to say about that substance, but essentially shunt aside
persistent structural aspects of the phenomenon. Any comprehensive
theory must thus account for what these attempts to explain
3. Although not the earliest discussion, see, e.g., John Henry Merryman, Policy, Autonomy,
and the Numerus Clausus in Italian and American Property Law, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 224 (1963),
the germinal treatment of the numerus clausus principle in common law jurisdictions is Bernard
Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE 239 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987). Merrill and Smith's recent
reexamination of the phenomenon, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, has sparked a significant
renewal of interest, see, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and
Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72 (2005) (discussing the numerus clausus principle in the context of
federalism); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1565-70 (2003) (offering
a modern Legal Realist view of the numerus clausus principle); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002) (arguing that the numerus clausus principle
serves to "aid verification of the ownership of rights offered for conveyance"); Daphna Lewinsohn-
Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669,
1730-39 (2003) (discussing an objective theory of well-being as a justification for the numerus
clausus principle); Joseph W. Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript, on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review) (discussing the nature of the estates system); see also Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries
of Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1176-78 (1999) (discussing the numerus clausus principle). For
a summary of recent scholarship on the numerus clausus, see Stephen R. Munzer, Commons and
Anticommons in the Law and Theory of Property, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 148, 156-57 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds.,
2005).
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.B.
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standardization leave out-that structure and content together are
important to unraveling the problem of the numerus clausus.
To begin with structure, standardization is a feature of
property law that transcends context. Versions of the numerus clausus
are found in Roman law and recur throughout the history of feudal
and post-feudal English common law.6 Likewise, some form of a
standard list appears in disparate modern civil law and common law
systems throughout the world. 7  Belying any account of the
phenomenon grounded in specific patterns of social relations or
normative coherence, this transcendence suggests that there must be
some overriding structural reason why property interests almost
always coalesce around forms defined by the state.
Turning next to content, although standardization is a stable
feature of property law, the particular list of forms and their internal
substance have always been dynamic. Legal systems add and prune
forms, tinkering with what the forms require while balancing
mandatory rules with permissible private specialization. This
management of standardization yields wonderful variety in the
content of the list and in the substance of the forms at any given time
and legal culture. Existing accounts of the numerus clausus either
ignore this dynamic aspect or treat the content of the forms primarily
as the artifact of private ordering.
These core features-foundationalism and dynamism-bring to
the fore a particular species of pluralism evident in the forms.
Pluralism in property theory eschews singular narratives in
understanding property law, focusing instead on the varied and often
competing normative and instrumental concerns embodied in the
institution.8 Pluralism recognizes property in all of its variety: as a
6. Rudden, supra note 3, at 241-42.
7. Id.
8. As discussed below, pluralism has been deployed in property theory to describe the ways
in which property embodies multiple, often conflicting, justifications as well as how property
reflects multiple pragmatic priorities. See infra Part III.A. Pluralism, of course, arises as a
conceptual frame in a variety of contexts beyond these property specific invocations, both inside
and outside legal discourse. Legal pluralism, for example, more generally engages with the
nature of multiple sources of formal and informal legal norms and sanctions. See Paul Schiff
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1169-79 (2007) (discussing legal
pluralism and its growing importance to our modern, globalized society). In political theory,
pluralism is identified with a focus on competing social and political forces. See, e.g., ROBERT A.
DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961) (outlining a theory
of political pluralism); AVIGAIL I. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL PLURALISM 1 (1995)
(discussing the 'legacy of political pluralism"). Religious pluralism similarly emphasizes the
variety and comparative values of multiple faiths. Pluralism arises as a conceptual tool in a
variety of other fields, including sociology, ethics, and cultural theory. See Sally Engle Merry,
Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 869, 872 (1988) (discussing the concept of legal pluralism
1600 [Vol. 61:6:1597
S TANDARDIZA TION AND PLURALISM
tool for resource allocation, as a foundation for individual identity, and
as a bulwark against the state, among other functions. In property
law, these roles and the values they reflect are as often in tension as
in harmony. From a pluralist perspective, then, any given form
represents the resolution of the competition between the multiple and
often clashing ends that property serves.
It may seem counterintuitive to link standardization-a
jurispathic force in property law9-to pluralism, a perspective that
emphasizes the accommodation of conflict and variation. But the
myriad crosscurrents and competing norms evident in the numerus
clausus hold the key to understanding its function. A pluralist account
of standardization approaches the numerus clausus as a mechanism
for structuring the preconditions for ownership. The numerus clausus
principle is a near-universal feature of property not because
standardization necessarily enhances efficiency or because the forms
tend to represent coherent categories of meaning. Rather, legal
systems standardize property law because regulating the variety of
allowable forms provides platforms onto which property law's
competing social and political goals can be engrafted onto private
ordering. Put another way, standardization is a near-universal feature
of property systems because the phenomenon facilitates the use of
property law to define, control, and regulate the public aspects of
private legal relations with respect to things-the foundational top-
down element of property law. 10
Recognizing this central regulatory function provides a new
way to resolve concerns about autonomy and efficiency that are
as a recurring theme in cultural studies); Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal Origins of American Legal
Pluralism, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 189, 199-202 (2001) (discussing the emergence of pluralism in
the twentieth century and its effects on philosophy, ethics, and American democracy).
Acknowledging the many meanings attached to pluralism, this Article focuses on a particular
property specific, and largely functional, incarnation.
9. Cf. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 40-44 (1983) (discussing
coercion and the "jurispathic" function).
10. Carol Rose used the bottom-up/top-down framework to describe competing approaches
to the relationship between property and the state. Carol Rose, What Government Can Do for
Property (and Vice Versa), in THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
AND PROPERTY 209, 210-11 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1999). As Rose pointed
out, the distinction between bottom-up and top-down aspects of property reflects the long-
standing debate about property as a pre- or post-political institution. Id. at 209-10. This debate
has surprising modern salience. See infra Part III.B. Katrina Wyman recently elaborated on
classifying theoretical approaches to property law as either bottom-up or top-down in the context
of economic explanations for the evolution of property systems. Katrina Miriam Wyman, From
Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 119-20
(2005). Wyman argued that bottom-up theories of changes in property regimes assume that
"demand generates its own supply," while top-down accounts recognize "the political character of
the process through which private property typically is established." Id. at 121, 124.
2008] 1601
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
staples of the current debate on the numerus clausus. Any given form
reduces the range of potential choices the holder of a property interest
might make with respect to that property, but the content of the
numerus clausus represents inevitable tradeoffs between those choices
and the effects those choices have on others. Understanding the
numerus clausus as the mechanism through which legal systems
determine the conditions for legal relations to be recognized as
property underscores the proposition that property, while amenable to
private ordering, is and has always been a public institution in its
basic constitution. Accordingly, standardization is only puzzling for
visions of property that privilege narrow conceptions of private
ordering and underappreciate property's social consequences.
This understanding of standardization, moreover, sheds light
on some broader controversies in contemporary property theory. There
has been much renewed interest recently, for example, in the
institutional and social forces that drive the development of property
rights.11 Competing stories of the formation of property recapitulate
hoary debates about property as a pre- or post-political institution.
12
Any specific property interest reflects many inputs, including the
nature of the resource, the effect on subsequent holders of the
resource, and the impact on third parties. Yet highlighting the
regulatory function of the numerus clausus underscores public aspects
of the institution of property. Contract as the realm of private
agreement cannot persist without some apparatus for enforcement,
but property at a more basic level cannot exist without the state.
Appreciating the numerus clausus as the common framework through
which legal systems define and mediate property interests
underscores the post-political aspects of property rights.
Approaching standardization as a regulatory platform also
provides a way to reframe an important assumption underlying the
current discourse about the relationship between intellectual property
and more traditional forms of property. 13 That assumption, often
implicit, is that forms of property in land and chattels are somehow
11. See infra Part W.A.
12. Property theory has witnessed a revival of accounts that emphasize pre-political aspects
of the institution. The resurgence of natural law perspectives in property scholarship is one
example, see, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2003), as is the strong libertarian underpinnings of the contemporary
property rights movement, see, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5-6 (1985) (arguing that "the state.., enforces the rights and
obligations generated by theories of private entitlement"); cf. Joseph L. Sax, Why America Has a
Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 513, 513 (2005) (discussing the conceptual
foundations of the "property-rights movement").
13. See infra Part IV.B.
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not subject to the same dynamic state definition and control as
modern intellectual property. Traditional forms of property in this
discourse stand, for better or worse, as a proxy for some realm of
private entitlement and natural ordering against which the state role
in intellectual property is compared. The regulatory function of the
numerus clausus, however, underscores that all property is subject to
the same ongoing adjustment and balancing that characterizes
intellectual property, even though the particular policy goals and
tradeoffs vary for any given resource.
Finally, this account of the numerus clausus has implications
for intractable debates about constitutional limitations on the
regulation of property, particularly in the context of regulatory
takings. 14 If the structure of property law found in the numerus
clausus begins as a public institution-not just "off-the-rack
entitlements,"' 5 but state-defined preconditions of ownership-then the
purported tension between private expectation and public control may
be overstated. Legal ordering appropriately reflects private
expectation, but more as a regulatory choice than as a matter of
ineluctable right.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the
numerus clausus principle and the problems that standardization
poses to prevailing conceptions of property as a tool of resource
allocation and as an expression of individual autonomy and identity.
Part II then examines the flurry of recent attempts to explain why
standardization persists despite these concerns. These accounts, while
illuminating individual aspects of the numerus clausus, still leave
much about the phenomenon unexplained. Part III accordingly
presents a pluralist perspective on the numerus clausus grounded in
the principle's underlying regulatory function. This pluralist account
of standardization as a regulatory platform better explains both the
structural function that standardization plays and the nature of the
tradeoffs instantiated in the content of the standard forms. Finally, as
explained in Part IV, this account sheds light on larger debates in
property theory, ultimately providing a richer understanding of this
core phenomenon in property law.
I. STANDARDIZATION AND THE FORMS OF PROPERTY
The numerus clausus is well recognized as a basic structural
element of property law in almost every common law and civil law
14. See infra Part IV.C.
15. Rose, supra note 10, at 213-14.
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system. 16 This Part describes the contours of the phenomenon-its
historical roots, how it manifests in modern law, and its institutional
context-and then explains the challenges that standardization poses
to prevailing accounts of the role and function of private property.
A. The Numerus Clausus Principle
1. Property in Standard Forms
To understand the limitations law places on the forms of
property, it is necessary to begin with a working definition of property
itself, which requires entering territory that remains surprisingly
contested. 17 It has become commonplace, even rote, to conceptualize
property as a disaggregated set of interpersonal relations. 18 Property
at times can appear as an unstable aggregate of individual relations
that disintegrates into incoherence at an extreme. 19 The malleability
16. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that the numerus clausus "appears to be
a universal feature of all modern property systems"); Munzer, supra note 3, at 156; Rudden,
supra note 3, at 241 ("In all 'non-feudal' systems with which I am familiar (whether earlier, as at
Rome, or later), the pattern is (in very general terms) similar: there are less than a dozen sorts of
property entitlement."). For a sample of international discussions of the numerus clausus
principle in other jurisdictions, see, for example, Brendan Edgeworth, The Numerus Clausus
Principle in Contemporary Australian Property Law, 32 MONASH U. L. REV. 387, 387 (2006)
(discussing the numerus clausus principle in Australian law); Andrea Fusaro, The Numerus
Clausus of Property Rights, in MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 309, 309 (Elizabeth Cooke ed.,
2003) (comparing and contrasting the numerus clausus principle in civil and common law
systems); Milo, supra note 2, at 593-600 (discussing the numerus clausus principle in German
law).
17. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 11-15
(2003) (examining a variety of conceptual approaches to the meaning of "property"); JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 26 (1988) (stating that "many writers have argued
that it is, in fact, impossible to define private property-that the concept itself defies definition").
18. The view of property as an aggregation of individual rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities is generally associated with Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, particularly his article, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 58-59
(1913). See generally J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV.
711, 724-31 (1996) (discussing Hohfeld's contribution to conceptions of property).
19. Thomas Grey has argued that property rights have disintegrated to the point that they
no longer form a coherent or necessary conceptual category. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration
of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69, 82 (J. Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds., 1980).
Grey is right that the boundaries of property have been seriously and thoughtfully challenged,
but property remains a central and productive conceptual framework in our legal system. See
J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 2 (1997) (discussing "how vital this idea [property]
is to the way we think about the world in moral and legal terms"); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry
E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 398 (2001)
(arguing that "the refined problems of concern in advanced economies exist at the apex of a
pyramid, the base of which consists of the security of property rights"); cf. Emily Sherwin, Two-
and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1075 (1997) (arguing that
1604
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of this disaggregated bundle-of-rights image, however, obscures the
fact that property-in whatever particular guise-retains an
underlying conceptual grounding in the effect that property rights
have to those on whom obligations are imposed without consent.20
As a working definition, then, property rights can be
characterized by the classic notion of rights in rem, binding or
operative on the world as a whole.2 1 This contrasts with rights in
personam, which apply to and bind only specific persons. 22 Property
can therefore be defined as a set of rights that are hypothetically "good
against the world." 23
At a general level, in turn, the numerus clausus principle
polices the boundary between property rights and contracts or other
obligations predicated on individual consent. Parties may tailor their
duties and immunities with respect to some "thing" with great
specificity and relatively few constraints as a matter of contract law.
Property law, however, generally limits acceptable interests to a
prescribed universe of standard bundles. 24 These bundles retain great
flexibility, but are nonetheless standardized.
although property "is a very difficult idea, and one that is susceptible to several
interpretations ... it is not a meaningless word").
20. PENNER, supra note 19, at 25-31.
21. This working definition necessarily obscures other equally fundamental approaches to
defining "property" in legal theory and economics. See Grey, supra note 19, at 71-72; STEPHEN R.
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 16-17 (1990) (discussing "the "popular conception" and "the
"sophisticated conception" of property). Definitions of property that attend to one or another
specific normative purpose can be set to the side for purposes of this discussion. Cf. Grey, supra
note 19, at 71-73 (cataloguing a broad array of "present usages of the term property in law, legal
theory, and economics"). Likewise the "layman's" socialized sense of property as "things" that are
normally mine or yours can be set aside. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 97-100 (1977) (describing the socialized, middle class, "Layman" definition of
property). For purposes of discussing the numerus clausus, it is appropriate to begin with the in
rem nature of property rights, tempered with the recognition-critical to any discussion of
standardization-that any given in rem right is always specialized. See infra note 25.
22. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 360-66 (discussing in rem and in personam
approaches). Thus the key feature of what constitutes property for present purposes is that it
binds and has effect on third parties, meaning individuals and entities not subject to consensual
agreement.
23. This starting assumption will be explored in greater depth below, see infra Part III.B.
For now, it is a useful placeholder.
24. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 4; Rudden, supra note 3, at 241. In this regard, the
numerus clausus serves a distinctly different function than standardization in contract law.
Contract law generally provides default rules where parties have not, or where it is less efficient
to have, completed the terms of their agreement. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92-93
(1989) (discussing "the sources of contractual incompleteness"). This is true at the structural
level of contract law, and it is also an important part of the practical negotiation of contracts. See
Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1036-37 (2006); see also
Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV.
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Because these standard forms of property are familiar and well
rehearsed in the literature, they warrant only brief review. 25 In broad
terms, the forms confer possession, provide non-possessory rights, or
grant security interests. 26 Behind this generalization lies important
variation, and forms both in their premodern and modern
manifestations include some unusual alignments of interests.
27
In contemporary American law, possessory interests generally
include the fee simple, the life estate, and the lease. 28 Possession can
be absolute or defeasible. 29  Possession can also be divided
concurrently-as with tenancies in common, joint tenancies, tenancies
by the entirety, and condominium or cooperative ownership-or
divided over time, as with future interests and timeshares.
30
1175, 1175-77 (2006) (discussing the ways in which boilerplate contract language and modularity
facilitate communication during contract negotiation). These contractual structures, however,
are rarely mandatory, leaving parties relatively free to modify them if they choose.
Rather than filling gaps or providing efficient default rules, however, standardization in
property limits the ability of parties to make agreements that vary from legally recognized
constraints. The room that is granted to private parties within the standard forms to specialize
provides some play in the joints, but the core limitation on the recognition of such innovations as
property remains.
25. A.M. Honor6's exposition of the incidents of "full" ownership-rights to possession, use,
management, income, capital, security, transfer, and residuarity, as well as prohibitions on
harmful use and liability to execution-provide a starting point for understanding the
parameters of any given form of property. See A.M. HonorS, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-24 (A.G. Guest ed., 1960) (discussing the standard incidents of
ownership); see also MUNZER, supra note 21, at 22-23 (comparing Hohfeld and Honor6's notions
of ownership). Each form, with the possible exception of fee simple absolute ownership in its
purest incarnation, represents a set of modifications to this hypothetical conception of "full"
ownership, and these modifications vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and over time. But see
Honor6, supra, at 109 (arguing that the incidents of ownership "have a tendency to remain
constant from place to place and age to age").
26. See Rudden, supra note 3, at 241-42. There are areas of property where the pull of
standardization seems somewhat less evident. Intangible property such as negotiable
instruments and payment rights seem to emphasize the private ordering that comes from
contractual relations. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Towards a System of Estates in Virtual Property,
1 INTL J. PRIVATE LAW 3, 3 (2008) (discussing the property rights of participants in virtual
worlds). Even in this context, however, there is at least some standardization evident. See id. at
3-4 (discussing cases in which courts have struggled to place types of intangible property into
existing conceptual categories).
27. Comparativists have long focused on variations within the forms of property. Bernard
Rudden swept most legal systems into the same basic framework with respect to the content of
the forms. See Rudden, supra note 3, at 241-42. There are, however, non-trivial distinctions
between the forms available in civil law and in common law, as well across particular common
law and civil law systems. Milo, supra note 2, at 588-89.
28. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 12-13.
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id. at 14-16. Interests in personal property can sometimes track the elaborate schema
seen in real property, but in practice tend to be more limited. Id. at 17-18.
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Depending upon how strictly one defines the "forms" of
property, it is also possible to include several other variations on
possessory interests. 31 The trust-splitting legal title and beneficial
ownership-is a traditional form, perhaps most notable in this context
for the fact that while it exists in common law systems, it is generally
unknown to Continental civil law. 32 The tenancy in partnership has
been surpassed largely by statutory forms, but instances of stable
divisions of ownership and control also include common business
entities such as corporations and limited liability companies.
33
Non-possessory interests-servitudes-include licenses,
easements, covenants, equitable servitudes, and profits.34 Although
the law of servitudes has undergone significant change in the past half
century, these interests still fall into recognizable patterns similar to
the estates. 35 Other emerging additions to the list of servitudes are the
31. As discussed below, see infra Part I.A.3, a threshold question in debates about the
numerus clausus in common law jurisdictions is whether the principle relates only to those
restrictions recognized as a matter of judicial self-restraint, as Merrill and Smith have argued.
Given that the civil law conception of the numerus clausus is explicitly grounded in legislative
supremacy, and the historical fact that many forms clearly in the modern "list" were originally
legislatively created, it is appropriate to consider forms created by courts and by legislatures in
the same conceptual universe.
32. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Function of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 434-35 (1998); see also Merryman, supra note 3, at
224 ("In Italy, as in other European jurisdictions whose private law is based on Roman notions,
there is no property institution like our trust .... ").
33. Berle and Means notwithstanding, see ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 3-10 (1932), one must be cautious about
stretching the concept of standard forms in property law too far. Most scholars would agree that
the trust should be included in the modern numerus clausus, although whether the trust is a
form of property or contract, or some other type of legal entity, is subject to debate. Compare
Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 32, at 434 (emphasizing the non-contractual aspects of trust
law), with John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
628 (1995) (arguing that the trust is a "prevailingly contractarian institution"). The historical
form of partnership is likewise a relatively uncontroversial inhabitant of the taxonomy. Modern
entities, however, are harder to characterize as a form of tenure, infused as they are with the
enabling approach of contract. Still, there are aspects of entity ownership and the ownership of
entities that are undeniably grounded in the law of property as used in this context, particularly
in binding strangers. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) ("[Tlhe essential role of all forms of
organizational law is to provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors' rights-a form of 'asset
partitioning'-that could not practicably be established otherwise.").
34. See Susan F. French, Highlights of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 35
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 225, 227-28 (2000).
35. Id. at 226. Building on the blocks of early servitudes law, modern servitudes have
flowered into complex mechanisms for private land use arrangements. See Susan French,
Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261,
1263-64 (1982) [hereinafter French, Reweaving] (stating that "servitudes are used today to
effectuate private land use arrangements ranging from simple driveway easements to elaborate
shopping center regimes"). Common interest communities governed by elaborate covenants,
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conservation easement, an important tool for achieving environmental
preservation and biodiversity goals with respect to land,36 and the
environmental covenant, which seeks to set the conditions under
which remediation of contaminated property will occur.
37
Security interests in property likewise coalesce into generally
recognized categories. The law of security interests for real property
contains a handful of standard forms, primarily the mortgage and the
deed of trust.38 Personal property security interests are similarly
governed by a regime of defined forms, largely through the Uniform
Commercial Code in modern practice.
39
Intellectual property is another area that yields a limited
universe of clearly recognized forms. Patents and copyright are the
primary forms, with trademarks and trade secrets having a somewhat
uncomfortable place in the menagerie. Less common forms appear as
well, including a property-like doctrine of misappropriation of
information;40 the "right of publicity" now found in about half the
states;41 and the droit de suite, a form of resale royalty right
recognized in California.
42
conditions and restrictions are now ubiquitous in residential development, and similar
arrangements are increasingly important in commercial real estate as well. See Michael Heller,
Common Interest Developments at the Crossroads of Legal Theory, 37 URB. LAW. 329, 333 (2005)
(discussing the growth of the common interest development legal form).
36. Jessica Owley Lippman, The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEB. L.
REV. 1043, 1096-98 (2006); Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of
the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 741-43 (2002); see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural
Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 34-36 (Spring
2007) (discussing the numerus clausus in the context of conservation easements).
37. Kurt Strasser, The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act: Why, How and Whether, 34
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 533, 533 (2007). Another innovation-and one clearly driven by top-
down pragmatic policymaking-is the avigation easement. The traditional rule of ad coelum,
proverbially granting owners property rights from the center of the earth to the heavens, has
yielded over the course of the past century to a generally recognized right for aircraft and the
like to invade this airspace. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.11[2] (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
1997).
38. See Raymond A. Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of Economics,
Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 397, 399 (1972)
(discussing the history of the standardization of mortgage forms).
39. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 833-35 (2001) (discussing security interests).
40. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 19-20 (tracing the doctrine to the Supreme
Court's decision in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)).
41. Id. at 20.
42. See Katrina Eden, Fine Artists' Resale Royalty Rights Should Be Enacted in the United
States, 18 N.Y. IN'L L. REV. 121, 127-33 (2005) (explaining the origins of California's droit de
suite statute and its contents); Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists
Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 509, 514-25 (1994)
(discussing in depth the origins of the right and its rise in Europe and California); see also Henry
Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and
1608 [Vol. 61:6:1597
2008] STANDARDIZATION AND PLURALISM 1609
Finally, a property form curiously overlooked in most
descriptions of the numerus clausus, despite its growing importance, is
what Carol Rose has labeled "hybrid property."43 Prominent examples
of this form include tradable emission rights,44 fishing quotas, 45 and
allocations of radio spectrum. 46 This type of property begins, as do
many property regimes, with what would otherwise generally be a
common resource subject to the risk of overuse by multiple
claimants.47 These regimes then create private exclusionary rights to
the resource as a matter of regulatory design.48 These devices are
established by the state and, as with the traditional common law
forms of property, grant a specified set of entitlements and carry
specified limitations and obligations. 49 Although our legal system
Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 95-96 (1997) (discussing "moral rights" for authors
and artists, including a right of integrity, a right of disclosure, and a right of retraction).
43. Rose, supra note 10, at 216.
44. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 313, 334-36 (2006) (discussing tradable pollution rights as a market based regulatory tool).
45. Wyman, supra note 10, at 155-56.
46. Cf. Dale Hatfield & Philip J. Weiser, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of
Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 549 (2008).
47. This is the classic "tragedy of the commons." See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
48. Rose, supra note 10, at 216; Wyman, supra note 10, at 154-56 (discussing limited entry
fishing licenses).
49. Rose, supra note 10, at 216. The pull of standardization may extend to even more
emergent property regimes. Scholars have recently begun to explore the application of the
numerus clausus to "virtual" property. This kind of property can refer generally to important
resources in the online world (such as e-mail accounts and domain names) and also to
entitlements that arise in increasingly popular online environments such as Second Life. See
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2005) (discussing the
contemporary landscape of "virtual" property rights); Moringiello, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing
virtual property in online environments). Moringiello argues that because the contracts that
create online entitlements-virtual "land" or "gold" or the like-are confusing, an information
cost minimization rationale supports standardizing these entitlements. Moringiello, supra note
26, at 5.
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attaches the label of property to other interests, 50 most of what we
consider property can be found in a core of standard forms.
51
2. Dynamism in Standardization
If property at a structural level seems almost always to
coalesce into standard entitlements, that standardization is dynamic
in practice. 52 This dynamism has three dimensions: in the list itself, in
the mandatory limits imposed on each given form, and in the
permissible range of variation allowed to private parties in altering
the forms.
a. Dynamism in the List
To begin, forms historically have been added and removed from
the universe of recognized property types. The contemporary "list" is a
product of significant contestation. As the legal system transformed
feudal forms into the estates familiar in modern law, servitudes came
into wide use, and intellectual property flourished. 53 Many familiar
(and not so familiar) denizens of the estates system were added as the
system developed. 54 Likewise, Anglo-American legal history has
50. The American legal system attaches the label "property" to some interests that only
tangentially figure in the discourse about the numerus clausus. In constitutional property, for
example, the Court at times (although increasingly less so) has found interests to be "property"
that would not cleanly map onto traditional categories. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 917-22 (2000) (discussing Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972), and its implications for constitutional property). Likewise, courts and
legislatures at times invoke the label of "property" to interests that only fleetingly relate to the
categories captured in the numerus clausus-professional degrees in divorce, for example. Cf. 9A
AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 1279 (2008) (noting that professional degrees are excluded from the
bankruptcy estate despite state law decisions that define them the same as property for purposes
of a divorce decree). Nonetheless, most interests that our legal system recognizes as property
tend to coalesce into the standard forms discussed in this Section.
51. The instinct to employ standard forms can also be seen when scholars make creative
arguments about novel property arrangements, which often appropriately involve calls for the
creation of new "forms" of property. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly
Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1467 (2008) (proposing legislative creation of "land assembly
districts," condominium-like legal structures that facilitate community bargaining for a portion
of the "assembly value" of land held in fragmented ownership).
52. Cf. Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 79, 94-95 (2001).
53. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 175-80 (6th ed. 2006); see also GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 37-42 (1997) (discussing both the decline of primogeniture and
entailments and the rise of freedom of alienation).
54. For example, in 1285 Parliament established the fee tail with the Statute De Donis
Conditionalibus. See 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 35.04 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed.
2004). The 'list" in intellectual property, to cite another example, expanded in the nineteenth
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witnessed the excision of a number of forms. The estate in coparceny, 55
for example, and the fee tail have been removed almost entirely from
the legal landscape.5 6 Other examples of the elimination of once-
important forms are strewn throughout the historical record.
57
The list, moreover, continues to fluctuate in modern law. Some
scholars have argued that the universe of interests is now closed.
58
However, even a cursory glance at the generative capacity of property
law over the past fifty years-a period that has seen the recognition of
forms such as the timeshare, 59 significant upheaval in the law of
servitudes, 60 and the creation of the droit de suite,61 to name a few
examples-belies the notion that the list has ceased developing.
62
century to add trademark as a relatively stable category. Beverly W. Pattishall, Two Hundred
Years of American Trademark Law, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 121, 121-28 (1978), reprinted in
ROBERT P. MERGES & JANE C. GINSBURG, FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 452-55
(2004).
55. Under primogeniture, sisters would inherit and hold the fee in coparceny when there
was no male heir; the eldest sister and her husband would then typically pay homage to the lord.
4 THOMPSON, supra note 54, § 35.04.
56. ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 38; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 174-75 (3d ed. 2005).
57. See Heller, supra note 3, at 1176 n.62 ("In Blackstone's time, the numerus clausus was
much more numerous, populated with incorporeal hereditaments such as corodies and
advowdsons that no longer exist. Over time, these forms were pared down to the streamlined list
that exists today." (citing A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 106-07, 121-22 (2d. ed.
1986))).
Like marvels that emerge from the fossil record, long lost legal forms that once walked the
earth would be quite surprising to most modern audiences. An older and fascinating example of a
form of property unknown in modern law might be jurisdiction. According to Nicholas Szabo,
medieval and Renaissance English law recognized jurisdiction as a franchise protected by the
law of property. Nicholas J. Szabo, Jurisdiction as Property: Franchise Jurisdiction from Henry
III to James 1 2 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch., 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=936314. These franchises had physical territory, title determined by seisin, and could
be defended by actions in trespass. Id.
58. Milo, supra note 2, at 593-94.
59. See, e.g., David R. Dubord, Time-Share Condominiums: Property's Fourth Dimension, 32
ME. L. REV. 181 (1980) (discussing time-shared condominium ownership in which each purchaser
has exclusive use and possession of the property for a fixed amount of time).
60. See French, Reweaving, supra note 35, at 1262-63 (discussing the twentieth century
history of the spread of "private land use arrangements").
61. See supra note 42.
62. One of the most recent innovations in the forms of property is arguably the chattel
servitude as it is emerging in the context of digital property. See Glen 0. Robinson, Personal
Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1516-21 (2004) (discussing the increasing
popularity of digital rights management tools, which are self-enforcing restriction mechanisms
that are hardwired into products). See generally Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New
Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008) (discussing the relationship between concerns that animated
judicial skepticism in the context of traditional servitudes and the emerging law of intangibles
such as computer programs and digital music).
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b. Dynamism in Mandatory Content
The numerus clausus is perhaps more importantly dynamic in
the changing internal content and meaning that the law imposes on
any given form. Public definition of the mandatory content of the
forms is an ongoing process, so that even the same nominal form can
have significantly different content over time and across jurisdictions.
The development of the fee simple absolute-often cited as the
most pristine and absolute form of property-shows this contingency
of internal content.63 In its earliest common law incarnation, the fee
simple was neither heritable nor likely alienable. 64 It took the rise of
the nobility to secure hereditability, at least by primogeniture. 65 And
it took the Statute Quia Emptores in 1290 to make the fee simple
alienable without the consent of the fee-holder's lord.66  This
development continued in American law, as autonomy and
marketability concerns led to significant reforms of restrictions on the
fee simple.67 Thus, the nominal form of the fee simple persisted, but
the most important characteristics of the conceptual category changed
by active regulatory intervention. 68
A similar transformation occurred with the tenancy by the
entirety in nineteenth-century American jurisprudence. This common
law form of marital estate traditionally involved the husband and wife
"seised of the entirety," each with a right of survivorship.69 Rights of
use as well as control of rents and profits were granted to the
63. Indeed, even a form as apparently uniform as the fee simple absolute carries variations
between jurisdictions. If one element of a form involves conditions of transfer, for example,
because the rules of inheritance vary from state to state, the nature of the form consequently
varies. And if the right to exclude is taken-rightly or wrongly-to be a defining quality of
property, then even that right varies from state to state. See Mark R. Sigmon, Note, Hunting and
Posting on Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L.J. 549, 558-60 (2004) (noting that the majority of
U.S. states require affirmative posting in order to exclude hunters from certain types of private
land).
64. 4 THOMPSON, supra note 54, § 4.06(a).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 87.
68. See 4 THOMPSON, supra note 54, § 34.01:
The fee simple estate has endured in the common-law system of property
rights even though the various property rights to which it pertains have
altered over time. The fee simple of the thirteenth century was unlike the
modern fee simple. The medieval estate consisted of only a set of feudal dues
and responsibilities, which all related to and burdened the land, whereas the
modern fee is simply full ownership subject to a less onerous set of sovereign
prerogatives.
69. John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital
Estates, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 39.
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husband, and vulnerability to the husband's creditors followed.70
Today, the tenancy by the entirety still exists in about half the states
but has been significantly transformed. 71 All states that retain the
tenancy passed versions of Married Women's Property Acts, along
with a variety of other legislative changes to the nature of property
held by married women. 72 The interpretation of these statutes,
however, has yielded significant variation in the actual content of the
contemporary tenancy, particularly with respect to creditors' rights.
73
As a result, although modern law recognizes a "form" of property
called the "tenancy by the entirety," that form has a very different
social and practical meaning than it did in early modernity and varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction today.
74
The more recent "revolution" in landlord-tenant law in the late
1960s and early 1970s provides another paradigmatic example of how
the standard forms embody legal change. 75 As courts and legislatures
reformed many of the most enduring features of the traditional
leasehold estate and the landlord-tenant relationship, particularly in
the residential context, these institutions generally acknowledged the
common framework of the relevant form.76 Thus, the meaning of the
70. Id. at 40-41.
71. See 4 THOMPSON, supra note 54, § 33.06(e) (discussing state variation concerning the
creation and contours of a tenancy by the entirety).
72. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 168-76 (describing the progression of legal
reforms to married women's property rights through the course of the nineteenth century, and
the political and economic rationales underpinning those reforms); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 53, at 312 (noting that by the end of the nineteenth century "all common law property states
had... enacted Married Women's Property Acts").
73. In some states, creditors can reach the entireties property of either spouse; in some
states, the entireties property of both spouses is immune from the interests of creditors of one
spouse. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 53, at 312-20 (reviewing caselaw on different
interpretations of creditor's rights held by those states retaining the tenancy by the entirety).
74. See Orth, supra note 69, at 40-49 (delineating the substantial practical and symbolic
"evolution" of tenancy by the entirety, the social, political, and legal forces that occasioned such
changes, and the doctrinal variation that resulted).
75. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant
Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 503-05 (1982) (outlining scholarly debate about the doctrinal
underpinnings of the "fundamental shifts in the technical foundations" of landlord-tenant law in
the late 1960s and early 1970s); Gerald Korngold, Whatever Happened to Landlord-Tenant Law?,
77 NEB. L. REV. 703, 705-07 (1998) (describing legal, social, and political forces that changed
internal meaning of the lease as a legal form); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential
Landlord-Tenant Law: Its Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 521-22 (1984)
(describing rapid adoption of implied warranties in landlord-tenant law despite the universality
of the preexisting rule of caveat lessee).
76. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 75, at 521 (describing the significant and widespread
alteration of the meaning imposed on the lease as a form of property).
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"lease" with respect to its property elements7 7 came to represent vastly
different rights and obligations than the same legal form had
represented at common law traditionally. 78 And, as with modern
tenancies by the entirety, there is now significant variation in what a
leasehold estate means from state to state-whether in terms of tort
liability for landlords, the nature of the implied warranty of
habitability, the respective rights and obligations of landlords and
tenants facing holdovers, or other aspects of the estate.
7 9
Likewise, intellectual property provides rich examples of
stability in form coupled with dynamism in content. As noted, the
primary forms of intellectual property evince tremendous continuity at
a general level.80 Congress and the courts, however, have engaged for
more than two centuries in a constant process of tweaking the nature
and incidents of the forms.8' To hold a "copyright" today means
77. One aspect of the revolution in landlord-tenant law was the importation of contract
concepts into what had traditionally been a predominantly property-based relationship. This can
be seen, for example, in the erosion of the concept of independent covenants-the idea that the
tenant's obligation to pay rent was not tied to the landlord's obligation to ensure possession, see
Smith, supra note 24, at 1189-and landlord mitigation duties in the case of tenant breach, see
Stephanie G. Flynn, Duty to Mitigate Damages upon a Tenant's Abandonment, 34 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 721, 784 (2000). Notwithstanding these contract-like mechanisms, much of the
revolution in landlord-tenant law was still aimed at modifying the lease as a form of property. Cf.
Rabin, supra note 75, at 531-40 (discussing changes in landlord-tenant law, including
limitations on discriminatory disposition of property, possessory rights in tenants even after the
expiration of a lease, and the landlord duty to place tenants in actual possession rather than
merely transferring legal right to take possession).
78. Other notable aspects of the transformation of the "lease" include modification of
traditional common law rules on delivery of possession, obligations for upkeep and habitability,
and landlord tort liability. See Rabin, supra note 75, at 520-40 (outlining each of these
alterations as among those representative of the "revolution" in landlord-tenant law).
79. See, e.g., 2 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN & PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR., FRIEDMAN ON LEASES §
16:3.4 (5th ed. 2004) (discussing landlord duties).
80. See supra Part I.A. 1.
81. Cf. Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
181, 186 (2003) (arguing that changes to intellectual property forms made by legal institutions
have been driven by interest groups). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
133-39 (2004) (describing the origins and development of property rights in creative works in the
United States); William Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the
Ownership of Ideas in the United States, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CRITICAL
CONCEPTS IN LAW 72, 73-78 (David Vader ed., 2006), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf (outlining history of major changes in
American intellectual property law); Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in
American Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 139, 139-46 (2008) (delineating
changes that have occurred in American intellectual property law beginning with the New Deal
era); Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property 290-401
(June 2005) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library), available at http://www.obracha.net/oi/oi.htm (detailing the evolution of
copyright in the United States).
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something quite different than holding a copyright a century ago, as
Congress has repeatedly extended the copyright's term and altered its
scope.82 Similarly, the scope and meaning of patentability have
expanded steadily over time, and trademark protections have seen
significant change in the determinants and subject matter of
protection.8
3
These are far from isolated examples. Throughout the law of
property, forms persist with nominal stability at the same time that
the default content of those forms changes, at times incrementally,
and at times radically. Additions and eliminations from the list are an
important part of the history of the numerus clausus, yet internal
dynamism is arguably an even more central aspect of standardization.
c. Dynamism in Private Latitude
Finally, there is an aspect of dynamism in the scope of private
modification to the standard forms. Continental civil law scholars
distinguish between limitations on rights that may be created and
limitations on private latitude to vary those rights.8 4 This private
latitude is also present in common law jurisdictions, allowing
modifications to many of the practical aspects of holding property,
such as the number of owners (for some interests8 5 ); the length of time
an interest exists (within defined constraints8 6); and the physical
82. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-95 (2003) (discussing the extensive history of
congressional management of the terms of copyright protection from the Act of May 31, 1790, ch.
15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, through the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, §§ 102(b),
(d), 112 Stat. 2827-28 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304)); see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281, 334-37 (1970) (discussing congressional modification of copyright); Fisher,
supra note 81, at 2-4 (chronicling the expansion in the default duration for copyright since 1790);
Bracha, supra note 81, at 278-400 (surveying transformations in the regime of copyright in early
American history).
83. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at 325-28 (discussing the "remarkable" nineteenth
century expansion of the scope of patent, copyright, and trademark); Fisher, supra note 81, at 4-
7 (discussing nineteenth and twentieth century extensions of "patent law"); Bracha, supra note
81, at 401-518 (surveying transformations in the regime of patent law in early American
history).
84. See Milo, supra note 2, at 594 (discussing the distinction between mandatory elements
("Typenzwang") and allowable modifications in continental civil law ("Typenfixierung")).
85. The estates in land distinguish between single and divided ownership, but once a
division occurs, there is no limitation on the number of co-owners, co-renters, etc., that are
allowed. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 53, at 275-80 (discussing concurrent property
interests).
86. This constraint on time is perhaps most evident in the limited rights granted in the
forms of intellectual property, but plays out in the common law estates in land as well. Cf. id. at
240-51 (discussing, among other duration restrictions, the Rule Against Perpetuities).
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dimensions of property where that is an issue.87 Thus, any given
example of a property form represents a balance between mandatory
components and private variation.
3. The Institutions of Standardization
While the list and the content of the extant forms change, it
would be inaccurate to state that the numerus clausus naturally
"evolves." There is no inherently progressive or determinative course
to the changes evident in property forms. The forms in existence at
any given time reflect a combination of legislative intervention,
common law accretion, private ordering, and a dose of path
dependence. Thus, the limits and the content of the standard forms
represent a pragmatic accommodation to changing political, social,
and economic conditions.
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith characterize the numerus
clausus in common law jurisdictions as a "norm of judicial self-
governance."88 They describe the phenomenon this way to characterize
the relatively silent treatment that the numerus clausus has
traditionally received in common law, in what might be described as a
"weak-form" numerus clausus.8 9 Civil law jurisdictions, by contrast,
recognize what might be called a "strong-form" numerus clausus,
predicated on an explicit recognition of the exclusive province of the
legislature to determine acceptable property interests.90
Institutionally, the establishment and modification of the
standard forms in our common law system has always been a dialogue
between legislatures and courts. This dialogue has been at times
competitive, at times collaborative, but has often simply proceeded in
87. Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1022-24 (2008) (describing the three dimensions of time,
owner, and physical dimensions with which property rules and applications of those rules must
be concerned).
88. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 9-12. Contra Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3,
at 374 (disputing Merrill and Smith's description of the institutions of the numerus clausus).
Merrill and Smith argue that, as between courts and legislatures, the latter are superior
institutions through which to modify standard property forms, for reasons of "clarity,
universality, comprehensiveness, stability, prospectivity, and implicit compensation." Merrill &
Smith, supra note 1, at 61.
89. A number of older English common law decisions explicitly mention a limitation on
legal innovation, see Fusaro, supra note 16, at 314-15, but the numerus clausus phenomenon is
more submerged in American law, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 9-12.
90. In practice, courts in civil law jurisdictions innovate in the interstices of code-based
restrictions. See Milo, supra note 2, at 597-98 (explaining that although "[iun civil law
jurisdictions the courts do not commonly create new real rights," courts nonetheless sometimes
acknowledge characteristics of property forms not explicitly stated in legislative codes).
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parallel. 91 If any pattern is discernable, it is that legislative change
has predominated, but courts do, at times, innovate.
92
Carol Rose has described a dynamic of conflict and resistance
with respect to specificity and open-ended approaches in the history of
property law, what she calls crystals and mud.93 The law of property
often begins with clear rules; courts introduce flexibility (historically
as a matter of equity), which private parties then try to contract
around to provide clarity, leading to more judicial fuzziness. 94 The
numerus clausus reflects this dynamic.95 One might think the
numerus clausus to be situated firmly in the realm of crystalline
rules-as most efficiency-oriented accounts would suggest. 96 But the
dynamism evident in the standard forms is in many ways a constant
process of "muddying," as competing goals play out in the composition
of the list and in the content of the forms themselves. Eventually, a
given form tends to achieve something like crystal status, but that
stasis is generally temporary; it is only a question of time before the
process continues. 9
7
In the contemporary American context, federalism adds a
dimension to this general institutional description of the numerus
clausus as legislative and judicial dialogue. 98 Property law in the
United States is largely a creature of state law and is thus subject to
interstate legal competition akin to that in other areas such as
corporate law. 99 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have argued
that interstate competition in property forms reinforces efficient
91. Cf. ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 104-24 (discussing the early nineteenth century
property codification movement).
92. Merrill and Smith cite the equitable servitude as an example of a relatively modern
innovation in the numerus clausus initiated by judges. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 16-17.
Personal property servitudes are another area of even more recent judicial innovation. See
Robinson, supra note 62, at 1455-58 (describing cases in which equitable servitudes were held
applicable to chattels).
93. See Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580-90 (1986)
(providing several examples for the hypothesis that property rules across time evince a conflict
between specified forms and piece-by-piece rules).
94. See id. at 585 (using mortgage law as an example of cycles in property law between
clear rules and more elastic standards).
95. See supra Part I.A.2.
96. See infra Part II.A.
97. Cf. Rose, supra note 93, at 581-83 (describing more generally the cyclical process of
drives for clearly defined rules followed by drives in the direction of equitable flexibility).
98. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at 173 (reasoning that the variation between doctrines
different states have applied in similar property contexts stems in part from differing traditions,
economic needs, political climates, geography, and the like).
99. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 92-101.
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tendencies and mitigates the risk of capture. 100 This competitive
interjurisdictional story seems evident in practice, as jurisdictions
modify the incidents of the forms to appeal to out-of-state interests. 101
Bell and Parchomovsky's emphasis on market forces may obscure
important cultural and social influences on the development of the
forms, 10 2 but their basic account of the political role in managing
standardization is compelling.
It is unnecessary to rely on any one account of the nature of
legal change to understand the institutional context of the numerus
clausus. The history of significant turning points in the development
of the modern forms reflects the pluralism inherent in
standardization, as different forms have emerged at different times
and in response to different social and economic pressures-pushing
the forms toward alienability, toward constraints on prior
entitlements, and toward other pragmatic and normative goals. No
singular narrative of legal change emerges. What is evident, however,
is the active and direct role of the state in defining the acceptable
bounds of property.
B. The Problem of Standardization
Although the recent flowering of scholarship on the numerus
clausus has done much to domesticate the phenomenon,
100. Id. at 99. Interstate competition can be framed in Tieboutian terms, see id. at 96-99
(citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)), or
in closely cognate terms of the disciplinary value of "exit" in terms of the ability of property
holders to choose alternative state regimes, Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 100-01 (citing
ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970)). In either event, interest-group capture is rendered less
likely, Bell and Parchomovsky argue, as interstate competition pressures local political
institutions. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 99-101.
101. This is evident, for example, in the competition that has arisen between states offering
forms of perpetual trusts. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 53, at 266 (discussing a trend
among states in favor of eliminating the Rule Against Perpetuities based upon a desire to attract
large trusts); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 82 (discussing the legal consequences of
"competition by the states for trust funds").
102. Bell and Parchomovsky build on Saul Levmore's argument that property law develops
either towards efficiency by responding to the forces of supply and demand, or as a result of rent-
seeking behavior by interest groups. See Levmore, supra note 81, at 182-84 ("Property rights
change over time either because the alterations maximize wealth ... or, more skeptically,
because an interest group has successfully brought about a new regime."); Saul Levmore, Two
Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S423-33 (2002)
[hereinafter Levmore, Two Stories] (giving further detail to the argument that transactional
pressures and interest group pressures form the two parts of the engine behind the development
of property law). These competing economic explanations, which will be explored below, see infra
Part IV.A, risk eliminating important layers in the forces that influence property regimes and
the nature of the legal system's response to these forces.
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standardization has long proven challenging to predominant accounts
of property. 10 3 As Merrill and Smith note, the numerus clausus
principle has been decried as "outmoded formalism," surviving as a
relic of premodern (and often manifestly hierarchical) regimes and as
a "trap for the unwary."10 4 Setting aside for the moment these
formalist critiques, two more fundamental concerns have emerged in
the literature. The first is the tendency of standardization to
undermine the efficient allocation of resources, and the second is the
tension between standardization and autonomy. To understand these
concerns, it is first necessary to detour briefly and review the primary
accounts of the nature and function of property.
1. The Many Lives of Property
Property is an institution with many lives. 10 5 Property plays a
foundational role in incentivizing investment and allocating scarce
resources. 10 6 As an institution, property is therefore central to
commerce and the private ordering that flows from transactions that
yield the highest and best use of a given resource.10 7 To oversimplify,
property serves this role primarily by granting exclusive rights that
then serve as the basis for free exchange.108 When economists discuss
property, this is the vision of property they often have in mind.10 9 This
103. See infra Part III.A for discussion of crosscurrents in pluralism as applied to property.
For now, it is sufficient to note that standardization has been identified as problematic for
multiple conceptions of property.
104. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 6-7.
105. See ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 1-2 (describing the theoretical underpinnings of
property as a personal, social, and economic institution that have competed throughout
American history); UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 17, at 11 (finding multiple conceptions of
property bound up in the term and explaining that they are part of the reason property as a
concept can be used for competing viewpoints on virtually any social issue); Sherwin, supra note
19, at 1080-84 (charting the logical, legal, and moral tradeoffs behind several conceptions of the
ends property serves that have prevailed at different historical junctures and among different
groups of thinkers).
106. See, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 19, at 1082-83 (describing multiple "instrumental"
economic roles played by property).
107. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (7th ed. 2007) (defining
common law property rights as "exclusive use of valuable resources" and contract law as
"concerned with facilitating the voluntary movement of property rights into the hands of those
who value them most").
108. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347-
50 (1967). As discussed below, see infra Part IV.A, Demsetz argued that private property allows
owners to internalize most costs and benefits and reduces the costs of interactions around
property. In this view, property serves to reduce the negative externalities associated with an
unrestricted commons.
109. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 375-76 (arguing that diverse schools of
economists all view property as essentially an allocation of use rights); see also Carol Rose,
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view, moreover, has normative implications (however contestable)
associated with the collective maximization of welfare thought to be
facilitated by the cascade of favorable transactions that security of
title enables. 110
Property, however, is equally important to individual
identity."' One strand of property theory highlights the intersection
between, in Hegel's terms, "freedom of person and of things."
11 2
Property in this view is less a problem of scarcity than of how
individuals interact with the material world. Hegel argued that
property supplies a tool for ethical development, providing objects
through which individual will might be realized, with appropriation
representing the imposition of that will on the world. 113 In the modern
discourse, Margaret Radin has offered the best account of the role of
property in fostering personhood, shifting from Hegel's concern with
self-actualization to focus more on property's role in promoting human
Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 40 (1990) (defining the "standard economic version of property" as the
identification of "who has what.., to facilitate trading").
110. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 36-39 (1944) (arguing that private
ownership of property, as a prerequisite for competition, renders all members of society better off
in the aggregate than in socialist systems in which externalities are collectively assumed); see
also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 26-27 (1962) (describing the necessity of
exclusive property rights in a maximally efficient economic system). This idea goes all the way
back, in essence, to Smith's invisible hand. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776).
111. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 54-78 (1996) (detailing the
implications of property to personal identity); C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to
Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 761-64 (1986) (discussing personhood
as one among several central constitutional roles played by property); cf. Carol Rose, Property as
a Keystone Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 340-48 (1996) (discussing arguments about the
centrality of property as a means of diffusing power in society and fostering the individual
capacity for self-governance).
112. Rudden, supra note 3, at 250.
113. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 40-53 (T.M. Knox trans., 1942) (1821); see also
WALDRON, supra note 17, at 351-60, 373-74 (discussing the basic tenets of Hegel's conception of
property and their implications for notions of freedom, individual personhood, and the exercise of
individual will in the external world). Hegel viewed the numerus clausus as a tool to resist feudal
encumbrances in order to facilitate individual freedom through the medium of property. See
Rudden, supra note 3, at 251 (describing Hegel's thesis and its continental legal impact); see also
Franceso Parisi, The Fall and Rise of Functional Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS DYNAMICS: A
LAW AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 25 (Donatella Porrini & Giovanni Ramello eds., 2007)
(discussing Hegel's view of property standardization). Merrill and Smith note the irony of
critiquing the normative role that the numerus clausus plays by reference to formalism's
connection to feudalism given that many scholars have identified the numerus clausus as a
conscious reaction to that very feudalism. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 7 n.15
(discussing the historical association in post-revolutionary France between the numerus clausus
and anti-feudal reform of fragmented ownership); see also Milo, supra note 2, at 588-89
(discussing the strictness-mitigating effects of courts of equity in common law countries as akin
to civil law's anti-feudal orientation and perhaps derived from it).
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flourishing. 114  Radin argued for considering property along a
spectrum. At one end is personal property, that which is most
constitutive of the self; at the other end is property that is held more
instrumentally, which Radin called fungible property.
115
Prescriptively, this would bolster a preferential position for property
rights that reinforce personhood. 11
6
Beyond allocation and identity, property is frequently
associated with political ordering, albeit in often diametrically opposed
directions. On one side, property is associated with certain strains of
individual freedom,11 7  even if the precise connection between
ownership and liberty is often misunderstood."l8 John Locke argued
famously that the state arose to protect property, and this vision of the
supposed sanctity of private property has been influential in our legal
culture from the outset." 9 This classical liberal view of property as the
realm of individualism has, however, always had a counterpart in
American political thought in civic-republican conceptions of
property-property as the locus of mutual obligation.' 20  This
conception of the interconnectedness of property has modern
resonance in the idea that property systems recognize expectations
that arise from property's inextricable linkage to social relations. 12'
114. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 968, 971-78
(1982) (arguing the logical further steps of Hegelian property theory view property as central to
not only the expression, but the growth of human personality).
115. Id. at 959-60.
116. See id. at 1009-10 ("The result of this rough weighing is that fungible property rights
should yield to others' personhood claims.").
117. Thus private property is often seen as providing a sphere of individual free will, apart
from the demands of society. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733
(1964).
118. See ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 2-3 (contending traditional notions of property as
essential to liberty are misconceived). See generally ROBERT HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW
(1952) (exploring tensions within conceptions of economic liberty associated with property).
119. The link between "ownership" and larger cultural and political goals has played an
enduring role in American property law. See Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by
Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and
Contemporary American "Ownership Society", 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 52-53, 53 n.21 (2006).
120. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 4-17 (discussing the enduring
"proprietarian tradition" in the American history of private property-the idea of "property as
the foundation for the proper social order"); William H. Simon, Social Republican Property, 38
UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1337-45 (1991) (outlining a "social-republican" model, wherein private
property owners undertake civic and welfare obligations as a consequence of property ownership
and are limited in their use of property by regulatory measures designed for collective social
good).
121. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 134-39
(2000) (arguing property laws are shaped in formation, development, and practice by the degree
to which they mirror the contours of common social relationships).
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Each of these myriad perspectives on the nature and function
of property potentially stands in tension-greater or lesser-with the
fact of standardization.
2. Specialization and Efficiency
To begin, one concern that the mandatory nature of
standardization in property law has raised for scholars in recent years
is the tendency of the numerus clausus to frustrate specialization. 12
2 If
property functions as a tool to allocate scarce resources, the law
presumably should give full expression to what market actors
determine to be the optimal configuration of interests.
23
Finding the highest and best use for property-that specific set
of characteristics in the proverbial bundle of rights that represents the
most appropriate method through which to allocate the resource-
arguably requires the kind of unfettered ability to specialize found in
contract law (and other areas of law that generally enable private
ordering).124 In this account, the numerus clausus imposes a direct
cost on legal entrepreneurship. Merrill and Smith label these
constraints on private ordering "frustration costs," 125 and these costs
can be seen as symptomatic of a larger phenomenon in the tension
between private ordering and state control.
3. Standardization, Identity, and Autonomy
The numerus clausus poses a slightly different, although not
entirely unrelated, challenge to conceptions of property that privilege
autonomy and property-as-negative-liberty. 126 By regulating and
limiting the acceptable bounds of individual choice, the numerus
clausus principle raises tensions for conceptions of property that place
individual development and personhood at center. 127 John Henry
122. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 35 ("Mandatory rules sometimes prevent the
parties from achieving a legitimate goal cost-effectively.").
123. See id. at 5 ("The principle that property forms are fixed and limited in number
represents an extremely important qualification to the principle of freedom of contact-a
principle widely regarded by law-and-economics scholars as promoting the efficient allocation of
resources.").
124. See Rudden, supra note 3, at 239 (arguing that the limited scope of things in which
property rights might inhere and the availability of other legal forms, specifically contract,
suggest that economic theories of property as the basis of exchange do not match reality).
125. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 35.
126. Cf. SINGER, supra note 121, at 61 (discussing the "major functions" of property in
"enact[ing] a form of social life").
127. Jedediah Purdy has recently elaborated on what he describes as a "freedom-promoting"
approach to property that echoes certain strains of the autonomy-enhancing view of property. See
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Merryman, for example, noted that as applied to the problem of dead-
hand control, the numerus clausus sacrifices the autonomy of present
interest holders in favor of vindicating the autonomy of future interest
holders. 128 This is especially true in terms of fostering alienability,
129
but Merryman highlighted the inevitability of competing claims of
autonomy any time property interests are channeled and divided.
130
This tension-property as a tool to restrain autonomy-is
endemic throughout the numerus clausus. At a sufficiently high level
of generality, the array of interests available at any given time
represents common patterns of property holding: possessory rights,
non-possessory rights, and security interests. 131  Yet in their
particulars, these interests are clearly channeled and controlled,
restraining autonomy and imposing some version of collective will on
the individual freedom associated with property.1 32 As with efficiency
concerns, the question again arises as to why property law is not more
open to unfettered individual or even community choice.
1 33
In sum, standardization challenges a number of prevailing
conceptions about property. The long-standing existence of the
numerus clausus rarely engenders debate among contemporary legal
scholars, but why property law retains this deep structural feature
remains contested.
Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New
Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1242-45 (2005) (positing a historical tradition of property as a
fundamental building block of individual freedom). Purdy links property to the full flowering of
human potential, extending themes evident in Hegel and Radin, among others. See id. at 1298
(contending that property rules set the "terms of social and economic cooperation" by which
persons can transform "potential into actual capabilities"). For the same reason that
standardization can be seen to frustrate individual autonomy, it can be seen to impose limits on
individual capacities on which Purdy focuses.
128. Merryman, supra note 3, at 225.
129. See infra Part II.A. 1.
130. See Merryman, supra note 3, at 225 ("The more power of dead hand control [a property
owner] is given the less autonomy is enjoyed by subsequent owners."); cf. Hanoch Dagan &
Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 567-77 (2001) (discussing the balance
of autonomy in the division of property rights, particularly in regimes that privilege exit and the
social gains from shared use of resources).
131. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 379 (discussing the contours of
"standardized forms with those attributes commonly desired and standardized names for those
forms").
132. See Singer, supra note 3, at 16-17 (stating as a defining factor of property law the




II. THE CONUNDRUM CONSIDERED
In many ways, Bernard Rudden set the terms of the
contemporary debate two decades ago in his exegesis of the numerus
clausus problem. Systematically canvassing and critiquing a range of
plausible explanations for standardization in property law, Rudden
could only conclude by essentially throwing up his hands and
declaring the phenomenon a mystery. 134
In recent years, a number of scholars have revisited the rubble
strewn across Rudden's landscape. Mirroring divisions in
contemporary property theory, recent attempts to explain the numerus
clausus have fallen into two general categories. One group of scholars
has attempted to explain the numerus clausus as a structural
phenomenon, focusing on standardization's potential efficiency
benefits. 135 A second group sees in the persistence of standard forms a
reflection of underlying social relations, objective meaning, or
democratic values 136-what can be described as ideal-type accounts.
1 37
As this Section explains, however, these accounts together cannot fully
explain the basic conundrum that Rudden identified.
A. Structural Efficiency Accounts
One collection of explanations for standardization in property
law focuses on how the structure of standardization promotes efficient
exchange and productive use of property-in alienation, reducing
fragmentation, and managing third-party information costs.
1. Facilitating Alienation
Perhaps the longest-standing justification for the numerus
clausus is the proposition that standardization facilitates
alienation.138 The numerus clausus directly protects against undue
134. As Rudden put it, "Answers abound ... but they all leave me in doubt." Rudden, supra
note 3, at 239.
135. See infra Part II.A.
136. See infra Part II.B.
137. See WALDRON, supra note 17, at 44-46 (discussing ideal types in property discourse); cf.
MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 9 (Guenther
Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., University of California Press 1978)
(1925) (discussing ideal types as an analytical tool).
138. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 24 (citing, for example, JESSE DUKEMINIER &
JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 204 (4th. ed. 1998) ("Once the estates system developed, judges decided
that standardization of estates furthered alienability by facilitating subsequent transactions in
the same resource.")); Rose, supra note 10, at 213-14 (describing the importance of the recording
system and government-created standard form interests in land and property arrangements in
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restraints on alienation by limiting parties' freedom to condition the
ability of future holders to alienate property. 139 The numerus clausus
is also said to facilitate alienability because allowing specialized
property rights creates the possibility that successors in interest will
continue to innovate, leaving property "encrusted with layers of
obligations."'140 Finally, standardization is seen to lower information
costs in transactions by creating a market for easily identifiable
interests.
141
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman recently elaborated
on this final alienability rationale. 142 Dividing property rights, they
argue, requires coordination (a common understanding of respective
rights) and enforcement (protection against opportunistic behavior).
143
Coordination and enforcement problems lead to underutilization of
resources because parties must overinvest in protecting their rights.144
The solution, they argue, depends on establishing adequate means of
verification: a third-party enforcer must verify the parties'
understanding of their rights. 145 In contract law, the contract itself
provides the means of verification. 146 Verification is more difficult with
property rights because holders may not be in privity of contract. 147 To
Hansmann and Kraakman, then, by limiting the menu of possible
understandings, the numerus clausus consequently minimizes
problems that nonstandard property rights impose on subsequent
transferees. 143
Rudden, however, dismissed these alienability arguments
fairly summarily. The numerus clausus can provide the building
blocks for almost any conveyance, albeit with less convenience than
facilitating alienation, especially among strangers); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Private
Property and the State, in THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND
PROPERTY, supra note 10, at 109, 115 (describing the limitations on forms in property law as a
response to ambiguities over ownership creating transaction costs).
139. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 24.
140. Rudden, supra note 3, at 248.
141. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 53, at 185-86 (quoting Merrill & Smith, supra note
1, for the proposition that "[s]tandardization of property rights reduces these measurement
costs"); Rose, supra note 10, at 213 (discussing "off-the-rack property" entitlements that reduce
transaction costs).
142. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 374.
143. Id. at 382-85.
144. See id. (suggesting that "transactions that would otherwise take place may not occur"
because of the increased costs associated with poor coordination and enforcement).
145. Id. at 383.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 384 ("There is a strong relationship between verification rules and types of
property rights--or rather, the forms of ownership-that the law is prepared to recognize.").
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specialization would allow.149 With respect to the concern with
"encrusting," there is no compelling reason why the legal system
should react to an impediment to transacting that seems eminently
capable of internalization in the market price of an interest.
150
Similarly, such price should reflect the cost of specialization, and there
is little reason to privilege legal constraints over the judgment of those
transacting in novel legal forms. Limiting the forms of property would
thus seem to be a particularly inefficient (and ineffective) way of
promoting alienability. 151
2. Productive Scale and Fragmentation
Some scholars have identified the numerus clausus as part of a
deeper boundary principle in property law that resists the excessive
splitting of interests in order to properly scale the efficient use of
resources. 52 This explanation, elaborated most forcefully by Michael
Heller in his work on the anticommons,' 53 focuses on the risk that
149. See Rudden, supra note 3, at 260 (arguing that limitations on conveyance merely
prevent owners from creating the desired interests "simply and cheaply" because they can
"almost always achieve [their] aims at some cost by the use of devices"); see also Merrill & Smith,
supra note 1, at 24 ("The problem with [the argument that numerus clausus effectively limits
undue restraints on alienation] is that the system of estates in land is sufficiently flexible that
one can nearly always find a way to effectuate a complicated conveyance.").
150. See Rudden, supra note 3, at 253-54, 256 (arguing that similar obligations may be
included as a matter of contract and that any such obligations would likely be reflected in
pricing).
151. One must distinguish between the individual purpose or effect of a given form in the
numerus clausus and the overarching effect of mandatory standardization as such. It is relatively
well established (although not entirely beyond question) that many changes in the list and
content of the numerus clausus as the common law moved from feudalism to mercantilism to
modern industrial relations were focused on enhancing the alienability of land. See infra text
accompanying notes 218-219. Most commentators also would likely agree that restrictions on
"dead hand control" are focused on allowing future generations to exchange property to put the
resource to its best use. These propositions, however, are quite different from an argument that
the numerus clausus itself is directed at enhancing alienability. Many other restrictions on
property rights reflected in the numerus clausus-such as the limitations on permissible forms of
servitudes and mandatory limitations on leaseholds-are arguably incompatible with
alienability as a purpose.
152. See Heller, supra note 3, at 1166 (discussing boundaries drawn in well-functioning
property regimes); Parisi, supra note 113, at 26 (discussing the numerus clausus as an
antifragmentation device). Rudden similarly noted (more skeptically) that the numerus clausus
might be explained by antifragmentation concerns. See Rudden, supra note 3, at 259 ("Perhaps,
then, there is sense in limiting the occasions for any of these expensive situations by restricting,
ere their birth, the class of real rights. If this be a good reason, it is strange that so little of the
standard doctrine and case law spells it out.").
153. Heller has led a significant wave of scholarship on the anticommons, a concept
originally identified by Frank Michelman. See Frank Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law
of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: Nomos OXIV 3, 6 (J. Roland Pennock & John
1626
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certain types of strategic behavior-primarily holding-out and free-
riding-can cause an asymmetrical spiral of fragmentation, leaving
property interests scaled too narrowly for productive use. 154 Heller
argues that property law accordingly limits the fragmentation of legal
interests to police against the overutilization of resources through a
tragedy of the commons and, particularly, underutilization through a
tragedy of the anticommons. 155
Heller's insights about the anticommons problem have proven
remarkably, and appropriately, fruitful.156 There is a mismatch,
however, between the problem of fragmentation and the solution
offered by the numerus clausus. 57 Standardization in property law
may limit types of interests, but standardization does not
meaningfully reduce the number of interest holders or the subdivision
of physical property, which are the primary triggers for the cycle of the
anticommons.158 Moreover, a variety of other legal mechanisms more
directly address the perils of fragmentation.1 59
3. Information-Cost Externalities
Rudden speculated that one justification for the numerus
clausus might be the problem that purchasers would face in
evaluating novel property forms. 160 Merrill and Smith built on this
insight (without Rudden's skepticism) to frame an account of
W. Champman eds., 1982) (describing a regime in which everyone has a right to the property in
the regime, and no one is privileged to use it without authorization by the others).
154. See Heller, supra note 3, at 1165-66 (discussing the dangers of high transaction costs,
strategic behavior, and cognitive biases associated with fragmentation).
155. Id. at 1166.
156. See Lee Ann Fennell, Common-Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907, 908 (2004)
(describing the recent focus on the problem of the anticommons as "constructive and
revitalizing").
157. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 51-54 (noting that the numerus clausus does little
to limit excessive fragmentation because it limits only the types of interests rather than the
number of interest holders); Munzer, supra note 3, at 156 (recognizing that the law of contracts
often allows parties to get beyond the limitations of the numerus clausus).
158. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 52 ("[W]hen it comes to division of the [property]
among co-owners, the law does not prevent an anticommons but rather leaves it up to the parties
to choose the degree of fragmentation they wish, and to bear the costs of any mistakes they
might make."); Munzer, supra note 3, at 156 (arguing that the doctrine does not limit the
number of right-holders or the size of the parcels, which are central to the anticommons
analysis).
159. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 53 (citing actions for partition, adverse possession,
the Rule Against Perpetuities, recording acts, the doctrine of changed conditions, and eminent
domain as examples of antifragmentation doctrines that are likely "to be much more direct and
cost-effective methods of preventing excess fragmentation").
160. See Rudden, supra note 3, at 246 (describing this problem as one of the main reasons
given for the numerus clausus of real rights).
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standardization based on its potential to reduce information costs to
market participants and other third parties interacting with
property.
161
With property rights, Merrill and Smith argued,
[Tihird parties must expend time and resources to determine the attributes of these
rights, both to avoid violating them and to acquire them from present holders. The
existence of unusual property rights increases the cost of processing information about
all property rights. Those creating or transferring idiosyncratic property rights cannot
always be expected to take these increases in measurement costs fully into account,
making them a true externality.162
As a result, the legal system balances the need to reduce this
information externality-by standardizing the forms of property-
against the frustration costs inherent in that standardization. 163 This
balancing yields a formula for seeking "optimal" standardization.
164
Standardization as a reaction to third-party information costs,
however, has limits as an explanation for the numerus clausus.
Problems arising from increases in the menu of forms may be solved
by notice-providing clear labels and definitions for the most popular
forms. 165 The marginal confusion caused by relatively obscure novel
forms is unlikely to undermine the market for property in the way
that Merrill and Smith hypothesize.
166
161. In a related vein, Rudden discussed whether standardization may reflect the fact that
property law imposes obligations on third parties without their consent. Rudden, supra note 3, at
247-48. As Rudden noted however, consent is rarely an issue in many areas of the law that bind
third parties, such as torts. Id. at 247. Consent, moreover, might be a reason for controlling
whether an interest binds third parties, but standardization standing alone is both an over- and
under-inclusive tool to moderate third party effects.
162. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 8. In Merrill and Smith's account, there are three
relevant categories of individuals potentially affected by the creation of idiosyncratic property
rights: the original creator, potential successors in interest, and other market participants,
including third parties who may incur liability in violating property rights. Id. at 27-28.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 122-125.
164. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 38-40.
165. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 380-82. As Rudden pointed out,
moreover, no matter how standardized the form of property in a transaction, the allowable
modifications by contract are (relatively) unlimited. See Rudden, supra note 3, at 255-56. Any
resistance in the legal regime to property specialization that can be attributed to negotiation and
information costs (and associated externalities imposed on the market for property) must have
an answer for the inevitable specialization that occurs through contract.
Stephen Munzer has also noted that balancing frustration costs and information benefits
requires not only a limited menu of forms, but also "that the types be individually well crafted
and that they hang together well as a whole." Munzer, supra note 3, at 157.
166. See Munzer, supra note 3, at 157 (discussing Merrill and Smith); see also Robinson,
supra note 62, at 1486-87 (critiquing the information cost hypothesis for the numerus clausus);
Singer, supra note 3, at 16-17 (noting the significant informational complexity that remains
despite the estates system).
1628
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The information-cost account also fails to account for the fact
that the numerus clausus in common law jurisdictions has seen not
only additions but eliminations from the list as well. 167 Any account of
standardization predicated on balancing information against
frustration costs (or, for that matter, on verification costs) stands in
tension with this process of eliminating forms that clash with
changing policy goals. Whatever externalities might be represented by
the addition of new forms or overly loose authority to specialize would
not apply to existing forms. The law would thus have no need to
perform what would otherwise presumably be a housekeeping function
best left to personal choice and the marketplace.
16 8
Finally, if standardization is concerned with notice or the
information effects of property interests on third parties, one would
expect that changes in technology should lift the strictures of the
numerus clausus. New forms accordingly should be entering the legal
landscape at an increasing pace as information-cost burdens drop.
69
Indeed, there have been numerous technological and policy changes in
the past half century that have lowered information costs relating to
property transactions. 170 Despite these significant changes, however,
the pace of innovation in the numerus clausus does not appear to be
rapidly changing. 17' New forms continue to emerge, 72 but at a pace
167. See supra Part I.A.2.
168. A similar argument could apply to the legislative creation of novel forms.
169. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 40-42. As Merrill and Smith argue, "[just as the rise
of land registers allowed some loosening of the numerus clausus, so too technology that lowers
information costs can be expected to weaken the numerus clausus further." Id. at 42.
170. Traditional conveyancing-and the ancient problem of assuring title-is a notable area
of innovation. Challenges to title are a staple of real estate litigation, but given the volume of
transactions related to real property, security of title has been transformed since early common
law. Modern real property conveyancing occurs in the context of robust public records and an
insurance industry that has reduced much of the risk once associated with uncertainty in title.
See Charles Szypszak, Public Registries and Private Solutions: An Evolving American Real
Estate Conveyance Regime, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 683-87 (2003) (discussing the widespread
reliance on title insurance); cf. Owen R. Phillips & Henry N. Butler, The Law and Economics of
Residential Real Estate Markets in Texas: Regulation and Antitrust Implications, 36 BAYLOR L.
REV. 623, 655 n.153 (1984) (noting that claims against title insurance tend to be below five
percent of premiums). More generally, technological advances in a number of areas have reduced
many information costs traditionally associated with property transactions in markets for real
property, personal property, and intangibles. See Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?
Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 115, 116-17 (1997) (discussing technology's role in lowering transaction costs
associated with identifying purchasers and sellers, negotiating, measuring performance, and
enforcement).
171. There is likely more "give" at the margins in the application of the numerus clausus
principle in common law systems than in the civil law systems where the phenomenon is more
explicitly recognized. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 69 (noting that courts in common law
countries are more likely to "tinkern with established legal doctrines"); Milo, supra note 2, at
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that does not seem commensurate with what might be expected from
information-cost explanations.
Considering what unites these efficiency-oriented accounts,
there is much wisdom to be gleaned. They provide an important
reminder that any explanation for standardization in property law
must reflect the essentially structural nature of the phenomenon and
must divine some enduring function from the persistent tendency of
property to align in standard packets. From a functional perspective,
these accounts appropriately emphasize property's central role in
allocating scarce resources and facilitating exchange.
Collectively, however, these accounts have little to say about
what the standard forms themselves contain. These structural
accounts likewise fail to account for the dynamic aspect of the internal
content of the standard forms; they overlook the peculiar pattern of
mandatory elements and private ordering that each form evinces.
Where these approaches lose force, then, is in their implicit rejection
of the variability represented by the forms themselves and the active
nature of state intervention in the mandatory content of the forms.
Theories predicated on the reduction in information-cost externalities
or the verification of property rights thus leave much of the function of
the numerus clausus unexplored.
B. Ideal-Type Accounts
Turning from structure to content, several accounts of the
numerus clausus have emerged that explain standardization not in
terms of transaction-cost economics, but instead with a focus on what
the individual forms themselves reveal.
1. Standardization and Social Relations
Rudden noted that one explanation for existing patterns of
property forms is that they might simply represent "all that is
required," and therefore the legal system need not innovate. 173
Building a much more nuanced version of this observation, Hanoch
Dagan has argued that the forms of property offer "a tentative
suggestion to parse the social world into distinct categories of human
594-95 (discussing the flexibility in allowing atypical property rights in both common law and
civil law systems).
172. See supra Part I.A.1.
173. Rudden, supra note 3, at 245. Rudden called this the "absence of demand" explanation
for the numerus clausus. Id.
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interaction."1 74 To Dagan, the forms should be understood as
"important default frameworks of interpersonal interaction"175 that
represent "unifying normative ideals for core categories of
interpersonal relationships,"' 176 subject to "ongoing normative (and
properly contextual) reevaluation and possible reconfiguration."'
177
Dagan is right to assert that the forms in the numerus clausus
involve meaning beyond the purely instrumental, and his approach
fruitfully aligns with the Legal Realist project of challenging the
formalism of extant legal categories. 178 Despite the self-professed
Realist nature of his analysis, however, Dagan underemphasizes the
contested nature of the content of the existing forms, placing great
weight on the connection between sccial categories and property
categories. Indeed, one distinct disadvantage of building a general
theory of the numerus clausus from the example of the tenancy by the
entirety, as Dagan does, is the fact that most other forms of property
are not so closely associated with a given pattern of social relations.
79
The numerus clausus principle applies to patterns of property holding
that correspond to a wide array of social relations, from deep intimacy
to paradigmatic arm's-length transacting.
80
Thus, although Dagan begins with an appropriate skepticism
about the normative underpinnings of property forms, he appears to
abandon that skepticism in favor of a view of the numerus clausus as
an ideal reflection of categories of social relation. Focusing on the
marital estate of the tenancy by the entirety, Dagan argues that the
forms in the numerus clausus are the result of "accumulated judicial
experience" about the appropriate "frameworks for social
174. Dagan, supra note 3, at 1559.
175. Id. at 1558. Dagan built his theory from an analysis of the competing approaches to the
numerus clausus taken by the majority and dissent in the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002). Dagan, supra note 3, at 1521. In Craft, the Court split over
the interaction between federal tax liens and state-defined immunity to creditors found in the
tenancy by the entirety. 535 U.S. at 276. The majority held that federal tax liens could attach to
a husband's interest in the tenancy, while the dissent relied on the nature of the tenancy as
conceptually indivisible to argue that there was, in fact, no separate interest to which the lien
could attach. Compare id. at 284, with id. at 291 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and id. at 289 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
176. Dagan, supra note 3, at 1562.
177. Id. at 1558.
178. See id. at 1528-29 (describing the Realist critique of deductive formalism).
179. Moreover, the diversity of patterns of marriage belies attempts to associate the tenancy
by the entirety with any singular normative vision of the ideal marital community.
180. Rudden similarly argued, in response to the absence of demand explanation, that the
wonderful complexities of actual property relations empirically undermine any attempt to link
the existing forms to the full range of property forms that might be useful or necessary. See
Rudden, supra note 3, at 245 (suggesting that certain types of desired shared entitlement do not
"fall easily within the present categories of co-ownership").
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interaction."' 18 1 But outside the context of marital estates (and even
within that category), there is reason to be cautious about the fit
between patterns of social relations and particular legal forms. 8 2 The
mandatory terms of a freehold or leasehold estate, for example, or a
patent, may have less to say about any particular alignment of social
relations than about the legal system's ex ante (and at times
idiosyncratic) structuring of the acceptable terms of holding property.
2. The Numerus Clausus and Objective Well-Being
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir has proposed an explanation of the
numerus clausus in terms similar to Dagan's focus on ideal
relationships. Lewinsohn-Zamir argues that property "must be of a
certain quality to fulfill its important function of sustaining and
advancing welfare, in terms of both identity and content."'8 3 For any
interest recognized by the numerus clausus, "there is some predefined
'core' of minimal content, without which the property right cannot
advance its owner's well-being." Lacking such a core, "the property
right resembles an empty shell, devoid of well-being-enhancing
content."1
8 4
To Lewinsohn-Zamir, the numerus clausus serves to protect
this core of meaning because the principle prevents attempts by
private parties to alter objectively meaningful rights and still retain
the label "property."'' 8 5 For example, the law will not allow a lease for
an unlimited term because that would render the reversion devoid of
meaning. Similarly, the law will limit servitudes that are not directly
related to land use because of their significant adverse effect on the
liberty and autonomy of distant parties.186
Although Lewinsohn-Zamir's general argument for the role of
objective welfare in property law is compelling, it does not entirely
map onto the breadth of interests represented in the numerus clausus
181. Dagan, supra note 3, at 1558.
182. Craft itself is a somewhat curious vehicle through which to unpack the numerus
clausus. The key issue at stake in the case was not primarily an understanding of the contours of
the nature of marriage as reflected in the notion of the tenancy by the entireties, although that
lurked in the background. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 282 (2002) (discussing the
nature of the tenancy by the entirety). The Craft Court brushed those concerns aside rather
quickly, focusing instead on the impediment that state-created constraints on creditors' rights
posed to federal interests relating to the collection of taxes. See id. at 288 (recognizing that under
state law this interest is not subject to creditor claims, but finding that it "by no means dictates
[their] choice" under federal law).
183. Lewisohn-Zamir, supra note 3, at 1733.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1736.
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and the dynamic nature of those interests. Her objective well-being
perspective leaves open why the law has developed the specific and
highly contextual tradeoffs that our present set of restrictions
represents. It may be that there are normative advantages to any
given set of property interests existing at a given time, but the forms
have emerged and continue to develop in highly contextual ways,
evidencing significant variability depending on the social, economic,
and political context in which a property system operates.
8 7
Lewinsohn-Zamir's objective well-being theory, moreover, does
not explain why the law will validate variations from the normative
core through contract, but not through property. If parties can more or
less easily contract around the strictures that the numerus clausus
imposes, contract law would seem to allow private ordering that lacks
the kind of objective determinants of well-being on which Lewinsohn-
Zamir focuses.
3. Democratic Estates
Finally, in a related vein, Joseph Singer argues in a
forthcoming article that the estates system reflects the "values that
shape the contours of social relations in a free and democratic
society."188 For Singer, the estates represent choices about the bounds
of legitimate social arrangements, which he describes as the
''normative commitments of a democratic society composed of free and
equal individuals who treat each other respectfully."
' 18 9
This perspective, which applies across the breadth of the
standard forms, ably describes the forms as explicit reflections of
normative choices. Singer is perhaps somewhat deterministic about
the particular nature of those commitments, 190 and, as will be
discussed, some crosscurrents in the larger panorama of the numerus
clausus represent normative frameworks that vary from the choices
Singer valorizes. This is not to detract from Singer's insights, but
rather to underscore the contingent nature of the particular values
embodied in the standard forms.
As with efficiency approaches to explaining standardization,
there is much wisdom in accounts that pay careful attention to the
content of the forms themselves. However, focusing on content as
determinative leaves unanswered questions about the structure of the
187. See supra Part I.A.2.
188. Singer, supra note 3, at 43.
189. Id. at 44.
190. See, e.g., id. at 49-50 (discussing the pluralism of values reflected in the estates).
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numerus clausus. These endogenous accounts obscure some larger
pattern-some deeper felt necessity in the structure of property that
transcends the content of any given form.
Although these accounts provide important insights into
individual examples of the numerus clausus, they have a harder time
assessing the particular patterns of state control over the standard
forms and the range of interests represented at any given time in the
numerus clausus. If the content of the forms is an artifact of social
patterns or categories of inherent meaning, how then to account for
the apparently odd regulatory intrusions that seem to define many of
the forms? These limitations-everything from the duration of a
copyright to the expansion of tenant leasehold rights to the freedom of
alienability associated with the modern fee simple absolute-
represent public regulatory goals, leaving much of the actual content
of the forms to private ordering.
C. Formalism and the Forms
So, where does that leave the puzzle of standardization? To
return to the earliest critiques of the numerus clausus, perhaps, as
Rudden speculated, the principle is simply formalism for the sake of
formalism. In this view, the legal system clings to categories largely
through inertia. This is certainly how some incarnations of the
standard forms can appear to operate in practice. 91
However slippery and often derided a concept, 192 formalism
should not be so easily dismissed here. It is true that formalism in its
Langdellian sense of legal categories as self-contained, logical systems
is certainly hard to credit with any seriousness in the modern
discourse over standardization. 193  Likewise, formalism as a
reductionist mode of judicial reasoning that deterministically links
general, contestable terms to rule-like outcomes seems equally
inappropriate for the numerus clausus.194
191. See Dagan, supra note 3, at 1525-27 (discussing formalism evident in the Craft Court's
dissent).
192. See Richard Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 619 (1999) (criticizing
the different modes of formalism); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988)
(discussing the "pejorative connotations" of the concept of "formalism").
193. See Pildes, supra note 192, at 608-09 (discussing the limits of the concept of formalism);
Schauer, supra note 192, at 522 ("Those who condemn such an outlook as formalistic criticize the
perception of law as a closed system, within which judgments are mechanically deducible from
the language of legal rules.").
194. See Schauer, supra note 192, at 513-14, 538 (discussing the interplay between




If formalism is deployed as merely a shorthand for resistance to
innovation, however, associating formalism with the forms of property
must account for the dynamism evident in the forms. 195 At a general
level, the numerus clausus does not resist change, at least not in the
long run.
Indeed, in managing that dynamism, there may be some
potential benefits to the path dependence inherent in formalism. 196 A
phenomenon like the forms of property may persist in modern law
both because the costs outweigh the benefits of change, 197 and because
existing categories may provide stability around which to innovate.
Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuck have argued in the context of
corporate ownership structures, for example, that a form may be
efficient because of the existing context in which the choice of form is
made.198 Likewise, the forms of property may persist because earlier
forms create incentives that perpetuate their existence.1 99 Given the
potential endurance of property relations, the costs of change in this
area of the law may be particularly acute to settled expectation.
200
The mandatory nature of the formalism found in the numerus
clausus does raise the question whether these relatively stable
conceptual categories may be doing some work for the producers,
rather than the consumers, of law. In other words, formalism may
have instrumental value in property law that derives from how
categorization channels legal innovation and regulation. Formalism in
some sense balances space for innovation with the symbolic value of
residual categories. 201 This function will be explored in depth below.
20 2
195. See supra Part I.A.2.
196. Cf. Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359,
S364 (2002) (discussing path dependence following an initial allocation of property rights).
197. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999) (discussing the phenomenon in
relation to corporate ownership structures).
198. Id. For Bebchuck and Roe, this constraint on choice of form in corporate ownership
flows both from the efficiency of operating within a legal and economic system that already
recognizes existing forms (in terms of sunk adaptive costs, network externalities,
complementarities and the like), as well as because of the internal resistance to change of
individuals invested in existing corporate structures. Id. at 139-53.
199. Cf. Michael Schill, loan Voicu & Jonathan Miller, The Condominium Versus Cooperative
Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 277 (2007)
(arguing that the predominance of the cooperative form over condominiums in New York, despite
the latter form's greater value, can largely be attributed to transaction costs and collective action
problems that hinder conversion).
200. Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 569 (2005) (discussing the role of expectation in property law).
201. Cf. Mark Fenster, The Folklore of Legal Biography, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1280 (2007)




At this juncture, it suffices to note that critiques of the numerus
clausus stemming from concerns about formalism may be missing an
important aspect of how standardization works. 20 3
Together, current accounts of standardization in property law
share a vision of the nature of property interests reflected in the
numerus clausus. Differing in their particulars and in their normative
commitments, each of the existing accounts in some sense posits the
numerus clausus as an organic response to economic or social
concerns-as essentially bottom-up approaches to standardization.2 04
These explanations may have salience for certain aspects of the
numerus clausus. But collectively they fail to explain the peculiar
intrusions on private ordering and autonomy so deeply embedded in
the law through mandatory limits on property. Unpacking the
numerus clausus thus reveals a central paradox: standardization
persists across time and disparate systems of law, yet it embodies
varied and often conflicting strains of property thought and practice.
How, then, to account for this essential pluralism?
III. A PLURALIST ACCOUNT OF STANDARDIZATION
A close examination of the multiplicity of forms and, most
importantly, the varied normative and instrumental goals
instantiated in the forms themselves over time, points to a novel
explanation for the numerus clausus. Standardization in property law
serves not primarily to achieve efficiency, nor do the current forms
necessarily represent any particular ideal types. Instead, the legal
system preserves standardization to provide platforms for resolving
myriad social conflicts and set the ever-changing ground rules for
defining private relations through property. In other words,
throughout its many specific incarnations, the numerus clausus has
always served the deceptively simple-but still underappreciated-
function of providing a basic regulatory framework for property law.
This yields a new conception of the numerus clausus that highlights
the uniquely public aspects of the law of private property.
202. See infra Part III.
203. Moreover, the issue is not formalism for the sake of formalism, in the sense expressed in
classical legal theory. That is, the forms (and here, the focus would be on the common law forms,
presumably most perniciously the estates system) survive to express a pre-modern
conceptualism that can only conceive of legal relations in terms of formal categories. The
argument would then be that although the Legal Realists left little of the intellectual
underpinnings of this view, those insights have yet to filter down to the actual practice of the
law.
204. See supra note 10.
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This Part begins with an exploration of standardization as a
pluralist phenomenon in property law. It then argues that the best
account of the pluralism inherent in the standard forms brings to the
fore the particular regulatory role that standardization plays.
A. Property as a Pluralist Institution
Disagreements between scholars about the nature and purpose
of phenomena within property often devolve into a shadow game about
the relative centrality of various justifications for property. Viewing
property as an allocative system tends to privilege efficiency
arguments; viewing property as intrinsic to human development or
political ordering can likewise lead to instrumental arguments, but
tends to foster more deontological accounts. On some level, although
scholars are careful to acknowledge the breadth of explanatory tools,
this tendency to privilege singular strains plays out in competing
explanations for standardization. 20 5 Accounts of standardization that
focus on particular aspects of the phenomenon, however, inevitably
miss lessons to be learned from the dynamism in the list and in the
internal content of the individual forms. 20 6
By contrast, a pluralist approach to standardization takes as
its starting point the many, varied, and often conflicting crosscurrents
embodied in this dynamism. Pluralism has proven a fruitful approach
to understanding property as an institution more generally. 207 In
moral and political philosophy, for example, pluralism provides a
robust analytical construct through which to examine the inherent
conflicts that arise from the variety of normative foundations that
underlie any property system. 208 Scholars in this context eschew rigid,
single-cause accounts in favor of grappling with overlapping and
conflicting justifications. 20 9 Pluralism has been equally instructive for
205. See supra Part II.
206. Cf. Lawrence C. Becker, Too Much Property, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 196, 198 (1992)
(discussing pluralist theories of justification for private property rights that fail to reconcile
inherent conflicts in pluralism).
207. As noted above, see supra note 8, pluralism has many guises across disciplines,
including political science, ethics, and others, but has particular valence for-and a distinctive
meaning in-property theory.
208. See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 99-107
(1977) (discussing and comparing competing moral justifications for private property); WALDRON,
supra note 17, at 42-43 (discussing the pluralism inherent in property systems).
209. Stephen Munzer, for example, has built an interesting pluralist theory of property
around three familiar principles-utility and efficiency, justice and equality, and desert based on
labor-offering careful arguments for prioritizing and contextualizing these justifications. See




legal historians tracing the development of property in exploring the
varying strands of culture and society reflected in that development.
210
And pluralism continues to offer insights into a number of
contemporary aspects of property law.
21 1
Because property is inherently embedded in particular cultural
contexts that embody multiplicity and conflict, property reflects layers
of meaning and purpose. 21 2 Pluralist approaches recognize the
influence of a diversity of institutions, communities, and
corresponding perspectives. 213  In property law, pluralism also
acknowledges the rich variety of property's functional roles-at times
competing and at times complementary 214-- and then seeks to draw
meaning from that mosaic. It is possible, then, to identify a particular
strain of pluralism in the property law context-less a species of
values pluralism and more a functional pluralism. Pluralism in
property reflects not only competing normative justifications but
equally important competing visions of property's pragmatic function
and the aspects of property that deserve greater practical recognition
in law.
When conflicts arise at a conceptual level, it might seem
reflexive to assert normative priorities. Pluralist approaches to
210. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 319-30 (discussing the complexity and social
character of ownership); Gregory A. Hicks, Memory and Pluralism on a Property Law Frontier:
The Contested Landscape of New Mexico's Costilla Valley, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 383, 383 (2005)
(describing the dispute between Hispanic settlers and Dutch and American entrepreneurial
owners over real property in Costilla Valley after New Mexico's Sangre De Cristo Land Grant);
Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 654 (2006) (using a pluralist approach to explain the transformation of
waste doctrine in property law).
211. See, e.g., Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2009)
(discussing the plural values inherent in ownership of land); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures
of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV.
129, 180-81 (1998) (discussing emerging trends in property law through multiple lenses); Singer,
supra note 3, at 57-68 (discussing pluralism in what Singer describes as a "democratic model of
property"). For an excellent recent pluralist account of intellectual property, see Madhavi
Sunder, IP 3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 258 (2006) (analyzing intellectual property law as a
convergence of identity politics, intellectual property rights, and other factors).
212. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 169 (1993) (arguing that to the
extent cultural commitments are in conflict and pluralistic, such cultural commitments in turn
create contested conceptions of property and the justice of structures of entitlement).
213. Cf. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1244-45 (2003) (arguing that pluralism means valuing the variety of
ethnic, religious, and cultural groups within society without treating any one group as more
privileged than others).
214. Cf. ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 385-86 (describing the dialectic of property in
American legal thought).
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property are not necessarily agnostic on these conflicts, 215 but tend to
emphasize the multiplicity of forces that shape the law.
216
Descriptively, pluralism acknowledges that any of property's varied
goals and functions may be ascendant or muted in particular contexts,
although property law itself rarely acknowledges an explicit meta-
hierarchy.2
17
Returning to standardization, it is clear that a multitude of
clashing normative precepts find voice in the forms. Consider, for
example, the basic system of estates, perhaps the paradigm denizens
of the numerus clausus. The standard account of the development of
the modern estates in land in American law emphasizes an inexorable
drive toward alienability and resistance to constraints on the free
market in land so crucial to the nation's emerging economy. 218 There is
no significant dispute that this contributed to the development of the
modern estates. 21 9 But the standard account tells an incomplete
story.
220
215. See, e.g., MUNZER, supra note 21, at 292-97 (observing that conflict is inevitable in a
pluralist theory of property, and that such conflict among principles demonstrates irreducibility).
216. A pluralist vision of property might seem to obviate the need to make analytically
critical distinctions. Thus pluralism risks eschewing clear solutions in favor of ad hoc
amalgamation, sacrificing depth and coherence in the pursuit of breadth and comprehension.
After all, if the institution of property inherently contains multiple goals and serves a variety of
functions, then understanding any specific aspect of the structure of existing property
arrangements might seem an exercise in culinary reverse engineering: sip the stew and try to
figure out the ingredients. Cf. Becker, supra note 206, at 199-200 (suggesting that pluralists face
a formidable challenge of showing both coherence and independence by having to demonstrate
that their multiple principles are at the same time irreducible, equally fundamental, and all
reach the same result). But see WALDRON, supra note 17, at 444 (decrying certain strains of
pluralist argument as "fraudulent eclecticism"). Any given rule or structure can serve multiple
goals or embody multiple aspects of property, but the important task is to bring coherence to the
underlying pluralism. See id. at 443-45.
217. Gregory Alexander offers an interesting counterexample in the interpretation by the
German Federal Constitutional Court of the constitutional property right contained in Article 14
of Germany's Basic Law. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY 97-147 (2006). The court, Alexander notes, has created a hierarchy
of protection for property based on the function that property is serving in a given context. Id. at
98. Property interests that primarily reflect economic ends receive minimal protection, while
property interests that serve dignitary and self-governance ends are accorded much stronger
protection. Id. at 103-04.
218. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 53, at 175-81 (discussing free alienation of
land as a factor in the development of property law). Hostility to restraints on alienability was
likewise a central aspect of late nineteenth century legal discourse. See ALEXANDER, supra note
53, at 278.
219. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 56, at 171 (discussing post-Revolution reform by state
legislatures to create a free, mobile market in land).
220. Cf. Claire Priest, Creating An American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in
American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 392-97 (2006) (examining the legal history of the role
of land in commercial transactions).
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Equally important to the development of the modern estates
were civic-republican concerns with the dispersion of political power
and property's role in structuring social relations. 221 Early American
legislatures modified or abolished forms with a very self-conscious
anti-feudal ideology influenced more by Jeffersonian than
Hamiltonian thinking.
222
Similarly, the property aspects of the modern leasehold estate
reflect a variety of normative goals. As discussed above, 223 much of the
''revolution" in landlord-tenant law transformed the mandatory terms
associated with the lease. These substantive changes included the
warranty of habitability, limitations (increasingly rare today) on the
amount of rent that can be charged, expansion of landlord duties with
respect to third parties, and limitations on landlord termination
rights.224 These changes were motivated largely by concerns of
distributive justice225 and have perhaps unsurprisingly engendered
economic critiques. 226 As some of these critiques have taken hold, the
balance has shifted away from tenants' rights.227 These debates,
however, have proceeded within the confines of the forms.
Servitudes have likewise provided platforms for resolving a
varied set of concerns. 228 Susan French has argued persuasively that
in modernizing the law of servitudes, the legal system must
acknowledge the purposes of policies underlying traditional
requirements-requirements such as privity or that a servitude "touch
and concern" the land.229 Under Professor French's guidance, the
recent Restatement of Property (Third): Servitudes replaces these odd
jurisprudential fragments with a more straightforward approach to
221. Similarly, earlier developments in common law reflected power struggles between the
monarchy and the nobles. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
222. See ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 26-42, 73-78 (contrasting Jefferson's Civic
Republican conception of property with Hamilton's wealth creating understanding of property);
see also Joseph William Singer, After the Flood: Equality and Humanity in Property Regimes, 52
LOY. L. REV. 243, 275-77 (2006) (discussing anti-feudalism and popular sovereignty as rationales
for alienability regimes in the development of the American common law of property).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
224. See Rabin, supra note 75, at 520-40 (describing the expansion in landlord duties).
225. Michael S. Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1523,
1560 (2007).
226. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 53, at 447-48.
227. See Korngold, supra note 75, at 707-08 (discussing the diminishing era of change in
landlord-tenant law).
228. See French, Reweaving, supra note 35, at 1281 (discussing the variety of roles that
servitudes continue to perform); see also Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1982) (arguing that servitudes allow for sophisticated
private planning schemes).
229. French, Reweaving, supra note 35, at 1289-92.
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the competing policy goals. Servitudes are generally valid under the
Restatement unless they transgress a handful of policy
proscriptions. 230 Despite this significant reform, the law of servitudes
retains a basic formal structure at the same time that it streamlines
the traditional categories.
23 1
Intellectual property is another area in which the pluralism of
the numerus clausus is evident. There is little disagreement that a
primary force animating the forms of intellectual property is a balance
between incentives for creation and the deadweight loss that attends
the grant of a monopoly, even if there remains much disagreement
about how to balance those effects. 232 But the forms of intellectual
property embody many other goals. 233 For example, many aspects of
these forms explicitly recognize the need to preserve a commons in
information or distribute creative resources broadly.234 This has given
rise to doctrines such as fair use, originally a common law
modification codified in the Copyright Act of 1976,235 and recognition
of the significant expressive aspects of intellectual property. 236 And
Congress has woven other normative goals into the fabric of
230. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000) (noting that servitudes
that are invalid because they violate public policy include servitudes that: (a) are arbitrary,
spiteful, or capricious; (b) unreasonably burden a fundamental constitutional right; (c) impose an
unreasonable restraint on alienation; (d) impose an unreasonable restraint on trade or
competition; or (e) are unconscionable); French, supra note 34, at 232-33 (explaining that the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes replaced the old "touch and concern" requirement
with the rule that a servitude is valid unless illegal, unconstitutional, or against public policy).
231. See French, supra note 34, at 227-28 (noting that the Restatement (Third) of Property:
Servitudes recognizes essentially five basic categories: profits, easements, negative covenants,
positive covenants, and the conservation servitude). It bears noting that while the Restatement
introduces much needed clarity to the law of servitudes, it has not been universally accepted in
the courts to date.
232. E.g., Mark Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004).
233. See Fisher, supra note 81, at 78-86 (discussing economic, ideological, and social factors
that contributed to the expansion of intellectual property rights); Wilf, supra note 81, at 203-07
(arguing that intellectual property law has been shaped by varying concerns reflected in New
Deal thinking).
234. See Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 798
(2006) (discussing conceptions of the public domain); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive
Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1539 (2005) (discussing the purposes of copyright
law). See generally LESSIG, supra note 81, at 133-39, 294-96 (discussing the public costs of the
gradual expansion of the scope and duration of copyright protections).
235. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
236. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 347-48 (1996) (arguing that copyright law is meant to stimulate the creation and public
communication of original expression, promoting democracy in civil society by spreading original
expression and distributing knowledge).
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intellectual property law. 237 Even as Congress and courts have
modified the content and elucidated the purposes of intellectual
property, the conceptual categories have remained largely intact.
New, emergent forms of property evince no less a multiplicity
of prescriptive and pragmatic goals than their historical antecedents.
As noted, so-called hybrid property forms are often justified as a basic
regulatory response to the risk of overconsumption.238 But as
governments have established this type of property, they have imbued
it with other policy ends. The design of international and domestic
emissions trading regimes, for example, reflects attention (albeit with
mixed results) to distributional concerns. 239 These regimes have
accordingly engineered tradable rights to reflect the unequal burden of
climate change. 240 On a more structural level, the initial allocation of
rights in these regimes reflects conflicting premises about the private
expectations and entitlements worthy of state recognition. 241
These examples, which are by no means exhaustive, 242
illustrate that the mandatory aspects of the numerus clausus involve
policies that quite explicitly constrain private ordering and individual
autonomy in the process of balancing competing interests. 243 These
tradeoffs are ubiquitous: dead-hand control is limited in bequests to
237. See Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain
Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1315 (2004) (discussing multiple values
inherent in the patent regime). Other normative goals instantiated in the present forms of
intellectual property include promoting access to medical care and addressing ethical concerns.
Cf. Emily C. Melvin, Note, An Unacceptable Exception: The Ramifications of Physician Immunity
from Medical Procedure Patent Infringement Liability, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1088, 1088-89 (2007)
(arguing that current legislation shielding medical professionals from infringement liability
renders medical procedure patents unenforceable and effectively useless). See generally Peter S.
Menell, The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed
Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 741-53 (2007) (tracing the features of intellectual property
that arise from the fact that intellectual innovations are interdependent, change with society and
technology, and operate outside traditional conceptions of ownership and control).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 43-49.
239. See Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a
Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 170 (2008) (noting the
insufficiency of the federal response to the climate crisis's effect on poor and minority
communities).
240. See id. at 170-71, 207-08 (analyzing the Kyoto Protocol's codification of a Clean
Development Mechanism to address the distributional consequences of carbon trading).
241. See Wyman, supra note 10, at 159-62 (discussing distributional and environmental
concerns in the allocation of fishing quotas); see also Dallas DeLuca, Note, One for Me and One
for You: An Analysis of the Initial Allocation of Fishing Quotas, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 723, 732-
42 (2005) (discussing the applicability of strands of property theory to the initial allocation of
individual fishing quotas).
242. For an excellent discussion of the development of the early American law of creditors'
rights in real property, see generally Priest, supra note 220, at 408-39.
243. See supra Part III.A.
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foster the autonomy of heirs, even if that limits the autonomy of
present owners;244 tenants are given rights to be free from retaliatory
evictions, even though this limits landlords' traditional right to decide
to whom to rent;245 copyright holders must cede to the fair use of the
public, even if this reduces the value of the copyright.246 Similar
pragmatic compromises can be found throughout the standard forms.
It should be clear from this discussion that the pluralism
inherent in the numerus clausus has some unusual and defining
features. The mandatory content inherent in the forms leaves much
latitude for private ordering.247 For example, although the forms take
varying approaches to limiting the duration of an interest,248 many
forms have the potential for temporal flexibility.249 Similarly, the
physical configuration and in many cases the number of interest
holders fall outside mandatory limits. 250 Functionally, almost any
practical goal that market participants seek can be achieved through
more or less cumbersome means.
251
What is mandatory in the individual forms over time, however,
represents an accretion of intrusions into private ordering. Yet these
public intrusions hardly represent any preexisting social category or
particular normative stance. There is clearly some concern with
efficiency in specific aspects of the numerus clausus, 252 but the
244. See LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 37-38 (1955) (discussing
tensions in the practical application of rules regarding dead hand control); see also Gerald
Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free
Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1553 (2007)
(discussing the conflict between dead hand control and autonomy for future owners).
245. See Deborah Hodges Bell, Providing Security of Tenure for Residential Tenants: Good
Faith as a Limitation on the Landlord's Right to Terminate, 19 GA. L. REV. 483, 494 (1985)
(discussing limits on retaliatory eviction).
246. See, e.g., Wainwright Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977)
("The fair use doctrine offers a means of balancing the exclusive rights of a copyright holder with
the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such as
art, science and industry.").
247. See Singer, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that although property law limits the types of
transferable estates, it allows for great freedom in the kinds of conditions and covenants that can
be imposed on land ownership).
248. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
249. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH U. L.Q. 667, 693-716 (1986) (discussing the future temporal dimension of
property interests).
250. Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 87, at 1039-40 (discussing asset specification in
property).
251. See Robinson, supra note 62, at 1486-88 (discussing property law's ability to create a
market for idiosyncratic property interests, and the economic constraints on that latitude);
Rudden, supra note 3, at 255-59 (noting that freedom of contract allows for almost any
contractual figure to be custom built).
252. Restraints on alienation in the fee simple is one example.
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phenomenon as a whole evinces a much broader array of regulatory
goals. Likewise, patterns of social relation (and objective, external
standards of well-being) play out in some, but not all, of the forms.
Paying attention to structure and content together thus reveals
an underappreciated role that the forms play in providing forums for
resolving recurring economic, social, political, and cultural conflicts.
The best way to account for the particular patterns of pluralism
evident in the standard forms is to recognize that the terms engraft a
variety of (at times clashing) public regulatory goals onto the basic law
of private property, while preserving a relatively simple structure
through which to do so. It is the variety and sheer messiness of the
mandatory content of the forms that make the numerus clausus so
interesting. 253 Standardization is both a stable and apparently
definitional aspect of "property" across time, culture, and political
systems, yet aspects of the standard list reflect many different
practical and normative aspects of property.
What this pluralism suggests most strongly is that the primary
role that standardization has always played is regulatory, providing
platforms through which the law instantiates a variety of normative
and pragmatic priorities. These platforms offer relatively stable
conceptual categories through which the legal system sets the
conditions for holding property.254
B. The Numerus Clausus as a Regulatory Platform
Reconceptualizing standardization as a means of providing
regulatory platforms resonates with older debates about property as a
pre-political or post-political institution and the role of the state in
ordering property relations. Most property theorists accept a general
framework in which state ownership is posed as an alternative to
"private" property. 255 In this view, the state's role in ordering private
property is akin to the role the state plays in contract law-providing
253. Cf. Singer, supra note 3, at 27-30 (discussing the importance of recognizing the
complexity of property law).
254. As noted in Part II, social relations and objective well-being theories come much closer
to accounting for what this Article argues is the function of the numerus clausus than
metastructural accounts and are accordingly in less tension with the emphasis on the regulatory
aspects of standardization that this Article articulates. Cf. Dagan, supra note 3, at 1559 n.207
(arguing that the law only encourages reliance and the shifting of property interests to protect
vulnerable parties when such activity facilitates some important human good).
255. See Heller, supra note 52, at 82-86 (discussing private, state, and commons property
regimes); see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition
Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653, S654-55, S658 (2002)
(comparing state ownership of resources to private ownership).
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a neutral apparatus of enforcement and to some contested degree
correcting for identifiable market failures. 256 But the numerus clausus
suggests that the state plays a different role in property law than it
does in other areas of private ordering-if only as a question of
emphasis, however important that emphasis is. In property law, the
state sets the preconditions for ownership, deciding as a positive
matter what can and cannot be property. 2 7 In doing so, the state
makes decisions about the channels through which property rights
take form. Standardization shows that there is no blank slate in the
world of property law.258
The view of property as post- rather than pre-political is often
associated with Jeremy Bentham. 259  Critiquing natural-law
arguments, including Locke's, 260 Bentham declared that "there is no
such thing as natural property, and that it is entirely the work of
law."261 Accordingly, Bentham argued, property "is nothing but a basis
of expectation, the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a
thing which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in
which we stand towards it."262 Property may reflect common
expectations, but as an institution it requires law. As Bentham put it,
"Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws
were made there was no property; take away laws, and property
ceases." 263
256. Cf. Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 14
(1959) (arguing that once property rights are created in a resource, the government "disappears.
• . except that a legal system to define property rights and to arbitrate disputes is, of course,
necessary").
257. See RADIN, supra note 111, at 19-20 (discussing the limits of commodification); see also
infra note 282.
258. See infra note 282 (discussing the relationship between private ordering and state
recognition of property rights).
259. Bentham was one of a number of early thinkers who emphasized the post-political
aspects of property, just as Locke was one of a number of thinkers (although the most influential
in our intellectual tradition) who emphasized the pre-political aspects of property. Hobbes, for
example, is also associated, albeit more problematically, with approaches to property that
identified the state as foundational. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 161-62 (Michael
Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1947) (1651) (arguing that property flows from the sovereign
state). Hume likewise recognized a state role, although the collective recognition that Hume
identified was based more on existing patterns uf possession, and in this sense Hume took more
cognizance of the structure of entitlements that preexisted any collective recognition. See DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 489-90 (L.A. Selby-Brigge ed., Clarendon Press 1965)
(1739) (discussing the role of collective convention in recognizing property rights).
260. Cf. Rose, supra note 111, at 333-40 (discussing Locke's social compact theory as a story
of pre-political property rights).
261. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931) (1802).
262. Id. at 111-12.
263. Id. at 113. Bentham drew his own moral from the necessity of the state to property-
that the normative goal of property regimes should be to privilege "a strong and permanent
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Bentham's particular species of property positivism prefigured
aspects of modern economic approaches to property and more critical
Legal Realist perspectives. 264 These two modern views approach
property with differing normative commitments, but a similar (if at
times unspoken) view of the nature of property rights. 265 For many
law and economics scholars, this conception of the state role generates
prescriptions that privilege minimal state ordering to promote market
choice. Economically oriented scholars often critique the design of the
legal system in ways that seek to facilitate exchange and reduce
transaction costs.
266
The Realists' conception of property starts with a similar anti-
essentialist focus on the legally constructed and contingent nature of
property. 267 For many of the Realists, however, the state's ordering of
property rights carried inherently distributional consequences. 268 This
led to prescriptions about distributive justice, recognizing that any
given distribution of entitlements grants power to some over others,
expectation." Id. This utilitarian frame has become a staple of modern economics, but is not a
necessary corollary to Bentham's view of the post-political nature of property rights.
264. Cf. BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE 73 (1998) (discussing
the links between Bentham and later theorists). This Section explores the modern descendents of
Bentham, but Locke has his modern adherents as well. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 12, at 12-
13 (elaborating on Lockean justifications for property). Although Robert Nozick rejects specific
aspects of Lockean justifications in Anarchy, State and Utopia, his theory of justice in acquisition
yields a pre-political framework for property rights. See WALDRON, supra note 17, at 128, 253-83
(discussing Nozick's theory).
The strength of the view of property as natural is likely driven by a sense in which the
rhetoric of "natural rights" might lend force to a contemporary constitutional framework that in
most situations affords "property rights" minimal protection. See Gregory S. Alexander,
Commentaries: The Ambiguous Work of "Natural Property Rights," 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 477,
477-78 (2007) (arguing that proponents of property as a natural right seek to bolster the
constitutional property right in order to halt governmental economic regulation of property).
265. See ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 381-82 (discussing shifts in conceptions of property
rights).
266. See Fred S. McChesney, Coase, Demsetz and the Unending Externality Debate, 26 CATO
J. 179, 179-84 (2006) (discussing the economist's goal to eliminate externalities and contrasting
Demsetz and Coase's views of the relationship between externalities and transaction costs).
267. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 468 (1988)
("[1Realists understood property rights as delegations of public power."). See generally AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM (William M. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) (collecting foundational Legal Realist
works).
268. See, e.g., HALE, supra note 118, at 541 (arguing that "government [is required] to choose
between different principles for determining how the wealth of the community should be
distributed"); Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 10-11 (1927)
(discussing the implications of the state's role in property); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at
335-37, 340-42 (discussing "allocative and distributive outcomes" inherent in property); Singer,
supra note 267, at 477 (discussing the state role in property rights).
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and there is nothing inherent in property that necessarily prevents
the state from changing that distribution.
269
These two approaches, generally predicated on the
disintegration of property into constituent elements, 270 have a hard
time accounting for the persistent conceptualism reflected in the
numerus clausus.271  But this tension can be reconciled by
disaggregating Bentham's positivism from his utilitarianism.27 2 One
need not subscribe to any particular account of the normative goals of
the state to recognize the patterns of state ordering. Indeed, the
pluralism evident in the numerus clausus belies the supremacy of any
such normative goal.273
Linking this pluralism to the conceptualism of the forms
highlights their role in channeling regulatory goals. As noted, most of
269. See Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 365 (1954)
(discussing the consequences of state recognition of property rights); Joseph William Singer,
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 41 (1991) ("Both the creation and the failure to
create a property right leaves people vulnerable to harm, either at the hands of the state or at
the hands of other persons."). This perspective continues to have modern resonance. See, e.g.,
UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 17, at 141 ('The state-in creating and enforcing [property] rights-
makes deliberate, binding, and final choices about who shall enjoy and who shall not.").
270. See ALEXANDER, supra note 53, at 381 (discussing the disaggregated, "bundle of rights"
conception of property rights).
271. The shared hostility to foundationalism in property rights that is a common intellectual
heritage of modern economic accounts of property and the Realists suggests a role for the state in
policing the numerus clausus. Thus Merrill and Smith argue that in achieving the "optimal"
configuration of the forms of property, it is preferable to rely on legislative, rather than judicial,
change. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 68. At the same time, Hanoch Dagan suggests that
society should modify the forms of property to bolster the relationships that develop around
property. Dagan, supra note 3, at 1559 ("Ideally, the existing property configurations both
construct and reflect the optimal interactions among people in given categories of relationships
and with respect to given categories of resources.").
272. Cf. C.B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND
CRITICAL POSITIONS 4 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (discussing positivism in property law). Few
contemporary legal scholars argue for purely conceptual approaches to institutions like property
in the antiquated terms with which formalism is usually associated. Cf. Penner, supra note 18,
at 733 (discussing the limits of the move associated with Hohfeld and Honor6 away from the
view of property as relating to "things"). Even contemporary natural rights scholars like Eric
Claeys tend to ground their arguments in somewhat utilitarian, rather than purely essentialist,
terms. See Claeys, supra note 12, at 1568-69 (discussing protection of property rights); cf. Eric
Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 452-54 (2006)
(discussing Richard Epstein's turn from natural rights to utilitarian perspectives).
In a recent series of articles, however, Merrill and Smith have attempted to reconcile this
tension by reviving a form of conceptualism in law and economics. See Bell & Parchomovsky,
supra note 200, at 551 (discussing Merrill and Smith as neo-conceptualists). Merrill and Smith's
theory of the numerus clausus is one step, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 26-34, but they
have also extended their account with its focus on information costs to a number of other aspects
of property law. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 39, at 777; Merrill & Smith, supra note 19,
at 387; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105 (2003).
273. See supra Part III.A.
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the ordering private actors seek to achieve can be accomplished by a
combination of the standard forms and allowable contractual
modifications. 274 Standardization, however, does real work in the legal
system by reinforcing the public goals with which private ordering can
conflict. Thus, the numerus clausus principle generally gains traction
in situations where deploying the forms reinforces a regulatory goal
embodied in property law. One example of this is recharacterization,
which is the process of rejecting attempts to evade the regulatory
goals of a given form, such as judicially deeming certain contracts for
the sale of land as mortgages.
275
At a more general level, when the legal system needs to
regulate a given area of property relations, it frequently invokes
existing categories. The state limits the forms of property self-
consciously at times by explicitly pruning the extant forms. More
often, the state refuses to recognize new forms passively. When it
limits the forms, it is preserving the conceptual space it needs to
regulate property. This is not the only regulatory tool, 276 but it can be
thought of as a threshold condition: categorizing property provides a
public vocabulary that the state recognizes and preserves to further
channel legal change.
Henry Smith is surely correct when he argues that property
law provides building blocks for a larger grammar. 277 But here again,
274. See id.; see also Rudden, supra note 3, at 255-56 (discussing the practical flexibility of
the numerus clausus).
275. In a variety of situations, courts override the apparent intent of parties to a property
related transaction, moving the nature of the property interest at issue from one "form" to
another. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 22 (discussing judicial recharacterization of
attempts to create "leases for life" into either life estates or tenancies at will). Perhaps the most
common example of recharacterization arises in the interaction between installment land sales
and the law of mortgages. Installment land sales generally involve long term contracts to
purchase real property, with title transferring at the completion of installment payments. At
times, however, particularly where purchasers stand to lose significant equity, courts will deem
an installment land sale to be a mortgage, thus triggering the consumer protections associated
with mortgage law. See John P. Musone, Crystallizing the Intellectual Property Licenses in
Bankruptcy Act: A Proposed Solution to Achieve Congress' Intent, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 509, 520
(1997) (noting that "installment land sale contracts and conditional sale agreements are often
recharacterized as mortgages"). Courts engaging in recharacterization tend not simply to impose
new requirements to mediate the potential unfairness of installment land sales, but rather to
place the transaction in a different "box," with all of the normative force that that box carries.
See, e.g., id.
276. See infra Part III.C (discussing varieties of regulatory strategies applied to property).
277. See Smith, supra note 272, at 1108 (discussing the communicative aspect of property).
Smith argues convincingly that legal institutions reflect compromises that the communicative
function of property requires, with different tradeoffs between information intensiveness (the
amount of information required to delineate a legal proposition), and information extensiveness
(factors that relate to the audience for that information). Id. at 1111. Smith argues that the more
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the question becomes from where does that vocabulary spring and
what purpose does it serve? Is it the artifact of private ordering, in the
way that some linguistic theorists argue that language is hardwired
into human biology, emerging organically? Or does a legal vocabulary
as specialized as the formalism of the numerus clausus require active
state intervention?
Looking at what the forms regulate and what they leave to
private ordering, as well as how transitions in the list and the forms
themselves occur, illustrates that the vocabulary that the numerus
clausus frames is not primarily an organic, bottom-up mechanism. 278
Standardization may be hardwired into the nature of property, but
that connection flows from property's initial public ordering. The
numerus clausus provides the means for legislatures, courts, and other
legal institutions to control the social aspects of property ownership.
In contrast to contract, which is paradigmatically (if
controversially) the product of mutual consent, what is "property-like"
about property is the fact that the legal system imbues a property
interest with power over the rest of society. In doing so, property
interests create relationships, and those relationships raise conflicting
interests that the legal system steps in to moderate, implicating the
state in property relations. 279 While the state is equally involved in
enforcing contractual rights, property rights are inherently embedded
in a larger social fabric. Even the most exclusionary, seemingly
isolated property right-the mythical sole and despotic ownership so
often associated with Blackstone 2 0-is only meaningful because it is
recognized by society. What distinguishes property from contract is
thus not only that real rights are good against the world.281 It is that
the world of property, amenable to private ordering, is and has always
been a public institution in its basic constitution. 28 2
extensive the audience for a legal communication, the more formal the communication becomes.
Id. at 1113.
278. Although a "top-down" phenomenon in property law, the numerus clausus still
recognizes the many "bottom-up" forces that shape the law of property. In doing so, however,
standardization provides conceptual categories into which the state can channel those forces,
recognizing some, rejecting others.
279. See Singer, supra note 3, at 22 (discussing the state's role in mediating property
interests).
280. See, e.g., Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987, 2000 (2008) (observing
that "property rights are nevertheless traditionally considered to possess the trait of an
exclusionary right with universal validity, as most famously depicted by William Blackstone").
281. See supra text accompanying notes 16-23.
282. Lon Fuller's analogy to language in the formalism of contract law provides a useful
point of comparison. See Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941)
(discussing the "channeling function of form"). Fuller noted that one function of formalism in
contract law-and his focus was on consideration-was to channel private ordering. Id. ("In this
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The regulatory function of the numerus clausus, in short,
reflects the insight inherited from the Realists that the choice of the
state to give legal sanction to one set of private expectations is just
that-a choice. 28 3 It may be more or less justified on various metrics,
whether efficiency, political freedom, equality of treatment, or
otherwise. But it is a choice nonetheless. 28 4
C. The Problem of Standardization Revisited
A pluralist account of standardization that emphasizes the
essentially regulatory role the phenomenon plays may thus finally
solve Rudden's puzzle. To begin with, this perspective solves the
paradox posed by the persistence of limited forms in a context that
otherwise allows the individualization of property rights on a number
of dimensions. If the purpose of standardization is to regulate the
scale of property interests or to facilitate the market for interests in
property, it is a curious mechanism through which to achieve such
aspect form offers a legal framework into which the party may fit his actions, or, to change the
figure, it offers channels for the legally effective expression of intent."). This channeling function,
however, imposes a relatively modest barrier to the legal recognition of the full range of private
agreement. Indeed, aspects of contract law that explicitly reflect social protections, such as the
unconscionability doctrine, are often seen as exceptional (and at times criticized as such, fairly or
unfairly). The forms of property-as a conceptual construct-operate at a much more
foundational level.
283. See HALE, supra note 118, at 541 (observing that even in deciding to leave "inequalities
undistributed, government would be making a choice.., the law confers on each of us legal
rights which others are bound to respect"); Cohen, supra note 268, at 380 (noting that
relationships become property as a result of state decisions).
284. To public choice adherents, the kind of regulatory compromises embodied in the
numerus clausus, if varying from a hypothetical optimal efficiency, are generally ascribed to
interest group rent seeking behavior. Cf. Levmore, supra note 81, at 183 (discussing "political
maneuvering" in the development of property rights). Bell and Parchomovsky's federalism
account, for example, is centrally concerned with tempering the risk of a kind of regulatory
capture of property interests at the state level by highlighting interstate competition to reduce
the rent seeking that would otherwise play out in the numerus clausus. See Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 100:
The existence of more efficient property regimes in other states, and the
ability of consumers to readily take advantage of such regimes, would create
a constant pressure on states with less efficient ones to modify their laws...
[and would] deter interest group lobbyists from promoting the inefficient
legislation in the first place.
However, ascribing all changes in entitlement structures (other than those that enhance
efficiency) to some form of interest group capture is overly reductionist of the ends of regulatory
structures in property law. This is not to deny that interest group capture occurs-it clearly does.
A pluralist view of the nature of legal change, however, requires recognition of the validity of
policy goals beyond efficiency-that the legal system exists to remedy inequality, to foster
individual identity, and (however imperfectly) to democratically channel competing priorities.
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purposes. 285 From any rational efficiency hypothesis, the mandatory
elements of the forms at any given time bear no necessary connection
to what the market might require.286 And from a social relations or
objective meaning perspective, the question arises as to why
particular legal patterns have emerged, some relating to relatively
stable extant social or normative categories but many not.
These paradoxes become less puzzling if the structure of the
forms has less to do with information externalities or inherent
categories of meaning and more to do with providing focal points
through which to resolve the social and economic conflicts inherent in
property.28 7 Bringing the active role of the state in managing the
forms to the fore suggests that standardization need not be as much of
a mystery as the contemporary literature assumes. The tensions that
Bernard Rudden first identified and that have resonated through
recent scholarship problematize a phenomenon that is only troubling
for a vision of property that privileges a fairly narrow perspective on
private ordering. This is not the place to plumb the depths of that
perspective, but merely to suggest that standardization fits more
comfortably with a vision of property grounded in public norms rather
than in freedom from state coercion.
288
285. See supra Part II.A.
286. One might posit that in the long run, not just the number of forms (Merrill and Smith's
optimal) but the content of the actual forms themselves will be efficient. Some have argued, for
example, that the elimination of the fee tail was efficient. See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake,
Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other
Perpetuities, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 411-15 (2005) (highlighting the inefficiencies of the fee
tail). But this is as open to question as the likelihood of any other normative goal to dominate the
forms.
287. The stability provided by the numerus clausus can serve the value that Bell and
Parchomovsky recently argued lies at the heart of property-increasing the value of assets and
decreasing the costs of trade. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 200, at 552 (arguing that "a
property system with stable rights increases the value of assets to users (now owners) and
decreases the costs of obtaining and defending those assets"). Bell and Parchomovsky's
essentially Benthamite view about the advantages of stable expectations, id. at 538, sheds light
on a number of interests and dynamics in property law. However, there is cause for skepticism of
their account as a positive matter. Property law in many guises reflects interests far removed
from the individual wealth maximizing potential of stability. Bell and Parchomovsky attempt to
side step this by taking aspects of property law that conflict with their value theory out of their
definition of property altogether. See, e.g., id. at 611-12 (dismissing the distributional goals of
marital property upon dissolution of marriage by divorce as outside the scope of "property").
288. Some might argue that conceptualism is universal in the law-that the basic way legal
actors approach their tasks is to place problems and doctrines into recognizable boxes, for
example, "negligence" versus "strict liability" in tort law. It is hard to deny the taxonomical urge
that plays out in many areas of law. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie,
Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008) (critiquing
taxonomical approaches to antitrust law). But there are many areas of the law where
conceptualism, to the extent that it exists, plays much more of a background role. Contract law is
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The question of how standardization as a regulatory strategy
interacts with more general regulation of property remains, and it is
fair to examine why one approach or the other predominates as the
locus for contestation. It is well recognized that regulatory strategies
can be ex ante or ex post. The former strategy sets the preconditions
under which an activity can take place or an institution operates.
Conversely, the latter imposes constraints or assesses liability for any
given state of affairs after the fact. Defining the mandatory content of
the numerus clausus is largely an ex ante regulatory strategy,
although modifications to content do at times apply ex post to existing
forms.28 9 It is fair, then, to ask why the legal system would need the
kind of ex ante categories represented by standardization to regulate
property if there are other more direct methods of regulation. 2
90
There is perhaps no single, overarching answer for why this
regulatory strategy continues to have the centrality it does in property
law. No metric, for example, balancing frustration costs and
information costs provides a singular reason why the categories prove
useful in their regulatory work. Rather, property law's continuing
reliance on standardization reflects a combination of path dependence,
historical memory, and convenience for the producers of law. As
the best counterexample to property law, but by no means the only one. But regardless,
standardization in property law clearly does work beyond the merely taxonomical.
289. Changing the terms of the "lease" rather than any particular landlord-tenant
relationship or the rules that govern common interest communities or condominiums, to take two
contemporary examples, means that by legislation or judicial decision, the conceptual category as
a whole changes. In other words, the law creates a category, reflecting existing social and
economic forces, and then deploys that category to regulate the acceptable boundaries of the
relationships created through such property forms.
Of course, private parties recognize this intuitively, and gamesmanship around regulatory
categories occurs. This then forces courts to step in and police the boundary, returning a
relationship around property to the appropriate regulatory category. One clear example of this
can be found in the process of recharacterization. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
290. Even as the forms of property have provided sites to resolve contentious pragmatic and
normative problems, the legal system has also regulated ownership in other ways, increasingly
so in the modern world. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities:
"Perception" Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2007) (finding that "there is no
system of property rights without laws regulating ownership"). Real property, of course, is
subject to comprehensive land-use regulation, and the contemporary regulation of personal
property-through health, consumer, safety law, and many other regulatory regimes-is
ubiquitous. See Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 317 (2002) (discussing the extensive regulation of
personal property). Moreover, nuisance and similar common law doctrines are simply another ex
post regulatory structure, albeit a structure usually triggered by private disputes over the use of
property. See Emily Sherwin, Three Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral




discussed above, 291 once a form exists, it provides a relatively stable
point of focus around which changes in meaning and content can be
negotiated. Less as a matter of notice and more as a matter of
channeling the public aspects of property through common frames,
standardization facilitates the regulation of particular problems in
property in a more targeted manner than regulating on a system-wide
basis (as with, for example, unconscionability in contract regulation).
That the legal system maintains multiple regulatory strategies
is hardly surprising and hardly unique to property law. If any pattern
can be discerned, it is that the category-specific strategy represented
by the numerus clausus may be giving way increasingly to more
comprehensive, general strategies as the default approach to the
regulation of property. But our legal system continues to find it useful
to define and redefine the mandatory content of the standard forms for
particular contexts. 29
2
Viewing the numerus clausus as regulatory platforms requires
embracing, even if cautiously, a certain strain of conceptualism in
property law. 293 This strain recognizes that not only the general notion
of property, but also categories within property, are meaningful. In
this view, the forms of property are primarily tools to assist legal
actors-courts, legislatures, and other formal sources of legal
recognition-in their regulatory role. Social and economic relations
are often contract- or norms-based, but when the regulatory goals of
property come to the fore, the legal system insists upon
standardization.
The regulatory platforms that standardization provides as a
convenience for legal actors have a larger signaling function as well.
The signal is not primarily what market participants, communities, or
social actors look to the law to embody; indeed, private ordering can
provide such signals as often as public regulation can. Rather, the
signal attends most notably to the task of property in mediating
relations, resolving conflicts, and setting the ground rules for social
and economic interaction.
Of course, acknowledging the work that categories do in
providing relatively stable arenas for contestation implies nothing
determinative, descriptively or prescriptively, about the present
constellation of forms or their internal content. This is as it should be.
The important point is to recognize that in defining and constantly
redefining the permissible realm of property, the legal system is not
291. See supra Part I.C.
292. See supra Part I.A.1.
293. See supra note 272 (discussing the revival of conceptualism in modern property theory).
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bound by any particular alignment of entitlements, and scholars must
pay close attention to the tradeoffs and choices embodied in any given
property regime.
Which leads back to pluralism. Property in formal terms exists
to the extent that it is recognized by the state. Even if private
convention and social norms can replicate or replace functions
associated with property law, 294 such private ordering does not
command the essential binding force on the world that defines
property.295 Thus, the process of that state recognition necessarily
reflects the tumult inherent in any social and political process. 296 The
process of resolving conflicts over a myriad of competing priorities in
property law has played out and will continue to play out largely
within the confines of the forms. 297
In the end, a regulatory view of the numerus clausus inverts
the basic problem posed by standardization-that it can reduce
efficiency (in some circumstances) and that it restrains individual
294. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 282
(1991) (discussing informal social controls).
295. In many situations in which private ordering mirrors the functions of property, the
arrangements lack the basic mandatory constraints on third parties that legal recognition of
such ordering provides. Informal norms that frequently develop around resources both
significant and mundane, see Richard Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public
Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S515, S524-25 (2002) (discussing the creation of informal norms), may
work reasonably well, at least in a cultural context of shared expectations. But the minute an
outsider cuts in front-disrespects the norm-there is simply no ground for insisting that the
norm be followed. Any expectation of priority is simply that-an expectation.
296. Bell and Parchomovsky have identified several core questions that any theory of
property must address-namely, which entitlements qualify for legal recognition, against whom,
what is their content, and how should infringements be remedied? Bell & Parchomovsky, supra
note 200, at 538. A pluralist account of the numerus clausus recognizes that the answers to these
questions are fundamentally contested and continue to evolve, and no account of property should
essentialize the answers.
A regulatory view of the numerus clausus, moreover, does not attempt to account for the
separate question of what can be made the subject of property. As scholars have noted, virtually
anything can theoretically be the subject of property (and thus exchange, see ALEXANDER, supra
note 53, at 380 (noting that "everything that has exchange-value is (or could be) property,
including babies, politics, even justice itself')), although some scholars have paid careful
attention to the limits of commodification. See RADIN, supra note 111, at 16-30. Questions of
anticommodification are important but essentially orthogonal to this Article's focus on the
mechanics of the political definition of property rights.
297. Understanding the standard forms as regulatory platforms, moreover, sheds light on
the institutional question of how the forms are actually policed in American law. As noted above,
Merrill and Smith characterize the numerus clausus as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint, while
continental scholars highlight the explicit positivism of civil law systems. See supra Part I.A.3.
The pluralist perspective on standardization this Article sets forward is capacious enough to
account for property interests, though rare, that fall outside of the standard forms, what the
Article has described as the weak form that standardization takes in our system. Since
standardization is primarily a regulatory strategy, and not the only one, there are other avenues
that the legal system takes at times to label an interest "property."
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autonomy (in most circumstances). Understanding the pluralism
inherent in the numerus clausus means that any particular normative
goal will rarely be ascendant in the forms or in any given form, and
that social, economic, and moral tradeoffs will always continue.
298
IV. IMPLICATIONS
A pluralist account of the standard forms as regulatory
platforms provides a new way not only to explain the numerus clausus
principle, but also to approach some recurring debates in general
property theory. In particular, scholars have paid increasing attention
in recent years to origin myths in property, positing increasingly
sophisticated accounts of how the conditions under which private
property emerges inform the development of existing property
regimes. Scholars are also engaged in an ongoing and vibrant debate
about the conceptual tensions that arise in defining intellectual
property as property. And no discourse is more active than the balance
between public ordering and private entitlement in the constitutional
dimension of property rights, particularly in the law of takings. This
Article's theory of the numerus clausus has relevance to each of these
discussions.
A. Standardization and the Development of Property Rights
Legal scholars are engaging increasingly with the mechanisms
through which private property initially arises. Fascination with
origin myths is a long-standing staple of property theory.299 Locke's
arguments for private property, for example, center on a story about a
natural progression from abundance to individual acquisition to
government protection of that labor.30 0 Other early modern thinkers
298. This perspective is open to what might be considered a teleological challenge. Until
fairly recently, primarily with Merrill and Smith's work, there was relatively little
acknowledgement of the existence of the numerus clausus in the American legal system, yet this
Article has argued for placing standardization at the heart of the regulation of property. The
answer is that actors in the legal system need not be self-conscious in deploying the conceptual
categories represented in the numerus clausus in the regulatory manner this Article describes.
299. See RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 10 (1951)
(discussing the longstanding impulse to explore "the origin and validity of the conventions upon
which ownership rests").
300. See Rose, supra note 109, at 38 (observing that Locke's Second Treatise on Government
"clearly unfolds a story line, beginning in a plenteous state of nature, carrying through the
growing individual appropriation of goods, then proceeding to the development of a trading
money economy, and culminating in the creation of government to safeguard property").
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likewise justified their views of the role of property and the state with
narratives about the evolution of property rights.
301
The renewal in interest has come largely from economically
oriented legal scholars' engagement with the problem of mechanism in
Harold Demsetz's account of private property. 3 2 Demsetz's basic
thesis was that when an external change in the costs and benefits of
resource management occurs, and social benefits exceed social costs,
private property develops. 30 3 Demsetz illustrated this thesis with a
story drawn from Eleanor Leacock's research into the emergence of
property interests in land among the Montagnes Indians, which
Demsetz hypothesized had developed in reaction to the increase in
value of beaver pelts after the introduction of fur trading.30 4
Demsetz never spelled out the mechanism through which this
internalization of the benefits of private property took place, nor how
any group of individuals undertakes the cooperation necessary to
make that transition.30 5 Some scholars argue that such phase shifts,
301. This is evident in the work of thinkers as diverse as Thomas Hobbes, see HOBBES, supra
note 259, at 204-05 (discussing the emergence of property rights), David Hume, see HUME, supra
note 259, at 490 (same), William Blackstone, see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 472 (William Draper Lewis ed., Geo T. Bisel Co. 1922) (1765-69) (same),
Jeremy Bentham, see BENTHAM, supra note 261, at 113 (same), Karl Marx, see KARL MARX,
CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 289 (Frederick Engels ed., Charles H. Kerr & Co.
1909) (1867) (same), and others.
302. See Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S333 (2002) (discussing the questions left unanswered by
Demsetz's account of private property).
303. See Demsetz, supra note 108, at 350 (arguing that "the emergence of new property
rights takes place in response to the desires of the interacting persons for adjustment to new
benefit-cost possibilities"). As Saul Levmore has noted, if the transition from open access
commons to enclosure (private ownership) is a question of costs and benefits, those functions
should presumably run in both directions. See Levmore, Two Stories, supra note 102, at S438
(finding evolutionary paths "that run from the commons to private property and then back
towards the commons"); see also Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino's Horn: Incomplete Property Rights
and the Optimal Value of an Asset, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S339, S339 (2002) (arguing that under
certain conditions, when the costs of enforcing property rights exceeds their benefits, private
property will revert to the commons). Moreover, as Carol Rose has argued, there have always
been categories of property considered inherently public. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 713-14
(1986).
304. See Demsetz, supra note 108, at 351 (discussing the transformation of property in the
Montagnes territory); Merrill, supra note 302, at S332-33 (summarizing Demsetz's treatment of
Eleanor Leacock's research).
305. See Merrill, supra note 302, at S333 ("[Demsetz] said virtually nothing about the precise
mechanism by which a society determines that the benefits of property exceed the costs, other
than to disclaim any position on whether this would necessarily entail a 'conscious endeavor.' ");
Wyman, supra note 10, at 121 ("What Demsetz neglected to specify is the mechanism by which
the underlying economic and social forces he identified as the impetus for the development of
private property ultimately are translated into individual rights."). Stuart Banner likewise
critiques Demsetz's failure to account for a collective mechanism to manage transitions in
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at least at the initial moment of transition from commons to private
ownership, are best understood through "invisible hand"
explanations. 30 6 Others, however, argue that these explanations
inadequately account for the political mechanisms through which
regime shifts occur.
30 7
A regulatory perspective on the numerus clausus sheds light on
this problem of mechanism. The contemporary fascination with origin
myths conflates two distinct questions. It takes the question of how
private property comes to exist from some state of commons and
translates it into a theory of how changes are made once there is a
regime of private property. This is another way to restate the cost-
benefit internalization of externalities view. In some sense, why-the
moving cause-is much less interesting than how. The basic problem
is the question of collective action: If property evolves through some
kind of legal parthenogenesis to capture the gains that come from
solving the problem of the commons, then why are the same collective
mechanisms inadequate to solve the underlying collective action
problem?
In this debate, the numerus clausus can be seen as the residual
echo of the creation of property rights by the state, although an echo
that continues to witness active intervention. Like the microwave
background radiation that survives the Big Bang, the standard forms
illustrate that when the state recognizes entitlement, it has to have
some formal construct around which to coalesce rights. If the first
question relating to property that a society might answer is whether
to enforce the decision to allocate a resource to A over B, the next
question is what to call that recognition?
The contemporary revival of accounts of property that
emphasize the institution's pre-political aspects must recognize the
consistent mechanism through which the state identifies "property."
Any "just-so" story of the state ratifying and protecting prior
property regimes, and proposes an interest group theory to explain such transitions. See Banner,
supra note 196, at 360 (discussing the process of reallocation of property rights).
306. See Wyman, supra note 10, at 121 n.7 ("Demsetz's explanation also might be described
as an 'invisible hand explanation' for the transformation of property rights.").
307. See id. (discussing the emergence of private property as the result of a political process);
see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice: The Case of Property
Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV. 673, 674 (2008) (discussing the dichotomy in
economic explanations for the emergence of property rights between efficiency accounts and
public choice accounts). Similarly, Andrzej Rapacynksi has argued that the traditional economic
account of property rights as a foundation for market economies ignores situations in which
market institutions themselves form the preconditions for property rights. See Andrzej
Rapacynksi, The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights, 10 J. ECON.
PERSP. 87, 102 (1996).
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entitlements, like the limits of social-relations accounts, pays
insufficient attention to the role of the state as a mediating force and
the inevitable complexity that attends that role. The persistence and
ubiquity of standardization at the least suggest a more interventionist
evolution of property rights than invisible-hand explanations allow. 30 8
It also suggests that framing the evolution of property rights as a
contest between efficiency and public choice leaves out many
interesting variables.
B. Intellectual Property as Property
One of the livelier current debates in the realm of intellectual
property revolves around the extent to which intellectual property is
or should be considered "property.' 30 9 Although some of the discussion
is categorical (e.g., do copyright, patent and trademark conceptually
belong in the realm of property?), much of the discussion is
consequentialist. Conceiving of intellectual property as property is
often rejected as overly deterministic or inappropriate in a particular
instance. 310 Or, the connection is embraced to draw on real and
personal property as a realm of individual dominion, defined chiefly by
strong exclusion rights.
311
308. See Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third
World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1008 (2006):
[Models predicated on] assumptions of autonomous evolution and
authoritative allocation overlook the inherently contested nature of formation
and change in property rights systems. Economic models tend to ignore what
anthropologists have long asserted: that property rights are both a result and
a cause of resource conflicts. As such, they are not so much authoritative
entitlements chosen by market participants and guaranteed by the state as
they are processes and products of constant negotiation, contestation, and
compromise.
309. The literature on this debate is voluminous. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabining
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (discussing the
"propertization" of intellectual property); Menell, supra note 237, at 718 (discussing the
implications of classifying intellectual property as a form of "property"); Henry Smith,
Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742,
1745 (2007) (discussing the relationship between intellectual property and "property"); Stewart
Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connection Between Land and Copyright, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 421 (2005) (distinguishing intellectual property rights from real property
rights).
310. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 309, at 445-46 (discussing the problems created by
analogizing intellectual property to real property).
311. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 108, 109 (1990) ("Patents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does with
real property."); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) (discussing the treatment of patents as property
and emphasizing the importance of a patentee's "power to restrict use"); see also Adam Mosoff,
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A common subtext to the view of property deployed in this
debate is that the freedom available to the state to moderate and
modify the "forms" of patent, copyright, and trademark is somehow
more fluid than the latitude granted to the state in, for example,
defining estates in land. Normatively, the debate becomes framed as a
question of how close intellectual property should be to a static vision
of more traditional property as the bastion of exclusionary rights,
relatively free from state ordering.
312
A regulatory perspective on the numerus clausus suggests
caution about this subtext. The kind of ex ante ordering evident in
standardization of real property is no less constitutive than the forms
found in intellectual property. The specific policy goals and the
tradeoffs they represent certainly vary, but the larger structural
dynamic is quite similar. The forms of property in land and chattels
are just as much the locus of policy compromise and state ordering as
exists in intellectual property. Granted, this process is much more
often in the background for traditional property than in intellectual
property. This does not resolve any specific question in debates over
the impact of considering intellectual property as property, and
analogies across forms may or may not be instructive depending on
context. A regulatory perspective of the numerus clausus does,
however, call into question any assumption that the malleability and
ex ante state control so evident in intellectual property is somehow
categorically distinct from other categories of property.
C. Reliance and Public Ordering in Regulatory Takings
Finally, understanding the standard forms of property as
providing regulatory platforms has consequences for current debates
about the law of takings. 313 Indeed, the numerus clausus played a
relatively unheralded, but highly illuminating, role in setting the
terms of one of the most important disputes in current constitutional
property law: the role of "background principles of property law" in
defining the balance between acceptable state ordering and private
expectation.
What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 375-76 (2003)
(discussing the problems with the exclusion theory).
312. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 309, at 4-5 (discussing the deployment of property rhetoric
in debates about the nature of intellectual property).
313. For a general description of the current landscape of regulatory takings jurisprudence,
see Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 28-37 (2008).
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This debate has gained importance since the Supreme Court's
1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.314 In
Lucas, the Court held that a regulation that restricts all economically
viable uses of property constitutes a per se violation of the Takings
Clause with one notable exception. 315 The Court had to account for the
history of restrictions on property that had destroyed all value without
compensation in the name of preventing harm-a rationale the Court
argued was indeterminate and manipulable. 316 Instead, the Court said
that takings liability would not attach to limitations on property
rights that "inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership."317 The Court seemed skeptical,
however, that the kind of environmental purposes South Carolina was
trying to achieve could be reconciled with what the Court saw as a
conceptually clear category of ownership-the fee simple. 318 In other
words, the invocation of a form was at least suggestive of a trump for
resisting legal innovation.
In the decade and a half since Lucas, this idea of "background
principles" has sparked a significant and ongoing scholarly and
jurisprudential debate about how to divine such principles and which
institutions-courts or legislatures-are best capable of identifying
such principles. The Court has only tentatively waded into the
conceptual chasm Lucas's elevation of "background principles" has
spawned. In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court was confronted with
whether regulations in existence at the time a transfer of property
takes place bar a claimant from bringing a regulatory takings claim. 31 9
Although the Palazzolo Court rejected a hard no-liability rule on the
basis of notice, 320 it did leave open the possibility that at some point
314. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
315. Id. at 1019.
316. Id. at 1022-26.
317. Id. at 1029.
318. Cf. id. at 1016 n.7 (discussing ambiguities with respect to the "deprivation of all
economically feasible use" rule, but concluding that the "difficulty" could be avoided because the
property interest at issue was a "fee simple").
319. 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001).
320. Id. at 627-28:
The theory underlying the argument that postenactment purchasers cannot
challenge a regulation under the Takings Clause seems to run on these lines:
Property rights are created by the State. So, the argument goes, by
prospective legislation the State can shape and define property rights and
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and subsequent owners cannot
claim any injury from lost value. After all, they purchased or took title with
notice of the limitation. The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick
into the Lockean bundle.
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and through some undefined transmogrification, most types of state
intervention in property rights can become background principles of
property law.
321
The only other clue to this process that the Court has provided
comes from Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, a case
that upheld a temporary moratorium on development. 322 The dissent
acknowledged that temporary restrictions on development had come to
constitute background principles of state property law.323 This was so
even though comprehensive zoning is a relatively recent phenomenon
in common-law-evolutionary terms. At some point between recent
enactment and the three or four generations that have passed since
land-use regulations became ubiquitous, Chief Justice Rehnquist
seemed to intimate, state ordering comes to inhere in title.
The issue of the mechanism through which state restrictions on
property become background principles essentially recapitulates the
question of property as a pre- or post-political institution. 324 If the
numerus clausus is the framework through which the state orders
private relations around property, then the discourse on "background
principles" should recognize the significant history of tinkering with
the standard forms. This does not necessarily resolve any individual
inquiry into the balance between public interest and protection for
private property, but does suggest a more expansive view of the state's
role in that balance.
325
321. Id. at 629-30:
We have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances when a legislative
enactment can be deemed a background principle of state law or whether
those circumstances are present here. It suffices to say that a regulation that
otherwise would be unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed
into a background principle of the State's law by mere virtue of the passage of
title.
322. 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002).
323. Id. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
324. Cf. RADIN, supra note 212, at 168 (discussing the limits of positivism in accounts of
transitions in entitlements). Thus, at a conceptual level, emphasizing the post.political nature of
property forms challenges the kind of fundamental property rights rhetoric driving
foundationalist interpretations both of the Public Use Clause in traditional eminent domain and
of the Takings Clause as applied to regulatory restrictions. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, The Public
Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory Fluff?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 335, 346-47 (2006)
(discussing "the slippery slope" of the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence).
325. See RADIN, supra note 212, at 170 ("Owners belong to the culture of property. They can
be understood to participate in it and therefore to understand the areas of flexibility, the areas
where evolution is to be expected."). Thus, if standardization serves an essentially public
function, prospective changes in the nature of the forms should arguably raise fewer expectation
concerns. Cf. Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
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Indeed, focusing on the constitutional balance between private
ordering and public control through the lens of the numerus clausus
suggests an interesting role for reliance. When the government creates
a form and invites reliance on that form, there is a strong argument
that private expectation formed on that basis deserves respect.
Conversely, however, the fact that the state often alters the forms
gives corresponding notice of the reach of private latitude. This will
often be a question of timing and the reasonableness of reliance, but in
the difficult balance between expectation and state ordering, a
regulatory perspective on the numerus clausus places a bit more
weight on the public side of the scale.
326
CONCLUSION
Stephen Munzer recently ventured that "the last word on
explaining the numerus clausus principle has yet to be uttered.
'327
Although this Article is hardly that last word, it has attempted to
provide a new framework through which to understand an intriguing
conundrum at the heart of property law. Mature systems of property
throughout history and in disparate legal regimes today adhere to a
limited menu of standard forms. This list has evinced remarkable
stability at a structural level and equally remarkable dynamism in
terms of the content of the menu and the substance of the individual
forms. The paradox that this poses is best explained by understanding
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1213 (1967) ("Security of
expectation is cherished, not for its own sake, but only as a shield for morale.").
326. Understanding the regulatory function of the numerus clausus has relevance as well to
an important debate in the jurisprudence of regulatory takings over the so-called denominator
problem. This problem arises from the fact that evaluating the impact of regulation on property
requires a predicate determination of the relevant "parcel"-both in physical and legal terms. See
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross-Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988) (discussing conceptual severance). Although the
Supreme Court has held that regulations are to be evaluated at the "whole parcel" level, see
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 328 (2002), a
myriad of practical interpretational questions continue to plague the lower courts in applying
that standard. See Rebecca Nowak-Doubek, Comment, A Victory for Property Rights: How State
Courts Have Interpreted and Applied the Decision from Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 405, 415-22 (2005) (discussing states'
application of the "whole parcel rule").
To the extent that the nature of the legal interest is a determinant of the relevant parcel, a
regulatory perspective on the numerus clausus acknowledges the contestability of such interests.
Indeed, in a footnote battle over the relevant parcel in Lucas, the majority oddly cited the fact
that the petitioner's property was held in fee simple, as though that resolved the issue. See 505
U.S. at 1016 n.7 (citing the relevant "interest in land" as a "fee simple interest"). Of course, the
fact that the estate was in fee simple is not inherently determinative of the baseline against
which a regulation's impact is to be assessed.
327. Munzer, supra note 3, at 157.
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that property law is first a public institution; it is through the
numerus clausus that legal systems define and regulate the landscape
of acceptable interests in property. Standardization is thus inherently
pluralistic, with the forms providing platforms within which to resolve
the inevitable conflicts perpetually at play in the law of property.
This approach to conceptualizing the numerus clausus clarifies
challenges about the phenomenon that have long vexed scholars. It
sheds light on an important aspect of property law as a political
institution, provides a new perspective on the intellectual-property-as-
property discourse, and has implications for contemporary concerns
about the scope of constitutional property.
In the end, the great strength of any pluralist institution like
property law is that it can accommodate ever-changing patterns of
social, economic, cultural, and moral relations. Standardization is
simply a tool-as useful as the goals it embodies and as vulnerable to
critique as any kind of formalism-for the legal system to instantiate
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Title 28, section 1331 of the United States Code provides the
jurisdictional hook for the majority of cases heard in the federal
courts, yet it is not well understood. The predominant view holds
that section 1331 doctrine both lacks a focus upon congressional
intent and is internally inconsistent. I seek to counter both these
assumptions by re-contextualizing the Court's section 1331
jurisprudence in terms of the contemporary judicial usage of "right"
(i.e., clear, mandatory obligations capable of judicial enforcement)
and cause of action (i.e., permission to vindicate a right in court). In
conducting this reinterpretation, I argue that section 1331
jurisdiction is best understood as a function of the federal right and
cause of action a plaintiff asserts. Under my view, these two
concepts, when weighed against each other, offer strong evidence of
congressional intent to vest the federal courts with jurisdiction and
form the foundational elements for the federal question
jurisdictional analysis. This principle underlies three standards
that offer both a better explanation of the Court's past section 1331
cases and better guides for future decisions than the Holmes test.
Under the first standard, section 1331 jurisdiction lies when a
plaintiff makes an assertion of a non-judicially created federal cause
of action and a mere "colorable" assertion to a federal right. Under
the second standard, section 1331 lies when a plaintiff alleges a
state-law cause of action and asserts a more weighty "'substantial"
federal right. Finally, under the third standard, section 1331
jurisdiction lies when a plaintiff asserts a cause of action created as
a matter of federal common law and a plaintiff asserts a
"substantial" federal common law right coupled with a sufficient
showing to support the right.

